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I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment requirement that searches and
seizures be "reasonable,"' as enforced by the exclusionary
rule,2 has become the major vehicle for Supreme Court efforts
to impose limits upon state law enforcement activity. After
some early waverings 3 and despite occasional digressions, 4 the
Court has emphasized two aspects of fourth amendment rea-
sonableness. First, the Court has required adequate evidence
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary remedy accepted for fed-
eral prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), but the
rule was not applied to state cases until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
3. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1950) (warrantless
search of building in which subject was arrested is permissible). Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969), effectively overruled Rabinowitz. But see New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981), infra text accompanying note 271.
4. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (search of dis-
abled car at rural garage for weapons "reasonable," despite absence of justifica-
tion for failing to secure warrant).
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to justify the intrusion. In standard search or arrest situations,
law enforcement officers must have "probable cause" to believe
the place to be searched contains evidence of a crime or the
person to be arrested has committed a crime.5 The Court has
found sufficient flexibility in the language and policy of the
amendment, however, to permit deviations from these criteria
when, in a majority's judgment, the balance among competing
interests militates in favor of exceptional treatment. 6 Second,
the Court has insisted, as a general rule, subject to certain ex-
ceptions, that the adequacy of the information available to law
enforcement officials to meet the justification requirement be
evaluated by a disinterested judicial officer before the law en-
forcement activity takes place. 7 In a typical search situation,
this means that a judicial officer must issue a search warrant
only after determining that probable cause to search exists,8
and that the warrant describes the premises to be searched and
the items to be seized with reasonable precision.9
This Article examines whether and to what extent the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness does or
should go beyond requiring a reasonably precise warrant and
evidence adequate to justify an intrusion upon protected inter-
ests.' 0 Specifically, it addresses the relevance of the fourth
5. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969) (probable
cause necessary for search warrant); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310
(1959) (probable cause to believe a subject has committed violation of law nec-
essary for arrest).
6. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (seizure of suspect for pur-
poses of weapons frisk requires only reasonable belief that officer's safety or
that of others is in danger); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)
(warrant authorizing inspection to determine compliance with housing code re-
quires only that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for con-
ducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular dwelling
at issue).
7. This Court has held that a search is per se unreasonable, and thus
violates the Fourth Amendment, if the police making the search have
not first secured from a neutral magistrate a warrant that satisfies the
terms of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.... Although
the Court has identified some exceptions to this warrant requirement,-
the Court has emphasized that these exceptions are "few," "specifically
established," and "well-delineated."
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 422, 423 (1981) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
8. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
9. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965) (given first amendment con-
siderations, warrant authorizing search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party of Texas" was not sufficiently precise). But
see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976) (warrant authorizing
search for and seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence" con-
cerning a described fraud crime was sufficiently precise).
10. In the search context, a protected interest arises when a person has a
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amendment to what might usefully be called "manner" or
"means" issues, that is issues concerning the manner or means
by which an otherwise reasonable search or seizure is imple-
mented. In Part II, the Article explores the number and nature
of possible issues through a discussion of a recent Louisiana
case." Part I evaluates the manner in which the Supreme
Court has addressed these issues. Finally, Part IV considers
the appropriate role of the fourth amendment in regard to three
particular aspects of searches and seizures using the analysis
that the Court has established for determining the scope of
fourth amendment coverage. These three aspects are the
amount of force used during the intrusion, the time at which
the intrusion occurs, and the duration of the intrusion.
II. THE ISSUES ILLUSTRATED: State v. Sierra
The facts of State v. Sierra12 effectively illustrate the vari-
ety of possible "means" issues. In that case, on the basis of
certain information, New Orleans police obtained a warrant au-
thorizing the search of an apartment for several specifically de-
scribed stolen items-a gold bracelet, two rings, and a
revolver-and "other stolen property."13 Five officers served
the warrant and entered the apartment, which was occupied by
Paula Sierra and Danny Alfortish. The officers handcuffed Si-
erra and Alfortish and searched the apartment for approxi-
mately one and one-half hours. One officer was assigned to
search each room of the apartment, and another was given re-
sponsibility for conducting a second search.14
Defense testimony, sharply contradicted by the state's evi-
dence, tended to show a series of incidents during the search.
According to the defense, upon entering the apartment, the of-
ficers pushed Alfortish against a wall, slapped a warrant across
his face, and struck him with a shotgun, breaking four of his
ribs. A number of pieces of furniture were broken, including
tables and a bed. Contents of drawers and cabinets were re-
moved, strewn about the apartment, and not replaced. Alfor-
tish was taken into the bathroom and his head pushed into a
toilet. The defense evidence varied as to whether this resulted
in immersing his entire face in the water or in only wetting the
reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized item or the place searched. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11. State v. Sierra, 338 So. 2d 609 (La. 1976).
12. Id.




tip of his hair. At the end of the search, one officer allegedly
reached into Sierra's clothing and fondled her.' 5
None of the described items and no other stolen property
was located during the search. As the officers stood on a small
balcony awaiting the car that was to pick them up, however,
one of them noticed a small pot containing marijuana plants.
Further investigation disclosed a similar pot on top of a bird
cage in the living room. 16 The plants were seized, and a return
on the warrant described the items seized as "one hundred
fifty-five 6-8 [inch] green plants.' 7
Although the defense contested the sufficiency of the affi-
davit to establish probable cause, the state appellate court ulti-
mately determined that the allegations were sufficient to obtain
a warrant.18 The warrant apparently described the premises to
be searched with adequate precision. The enumerated items
also appear to have been described sufficiently, although the
warrant's authorization to search for "other [undescribed] sto-
len property"' 9 may have rendered it subject to challenge. 20
The most difficult issue, however, was raised by Sierra's claim
that even if the warrant was valid and authorized a search of
her premises, the manner in which the officers conducted this
particular search rendered it unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 2 ' Although the appellate court's discussion does
not detail Sierra's precise arguments, the defense version of
the search suggests a number of related but distinguishable
claims.
If the alleged mistreatment of Alfortish was part of the pro-
cess of gaining entry into the premises and was excessive
under the circumstances, does the use of this manner of entry
render the search unreasonable? Once police obtained entry,
the officers allegedly caused physical damage to property, ap-
parently unnecessarily since the damage was not essential to
obtain access to locations where the stolen items might have
been secreted. The officers also "damaged" the order of the
premises by leaving items strewn so the occupants would have
to spend considerable time and effort to return the premises to
15. Id. at 613-14.
16. Id. at 617 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 617 n.2 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 611-13.
19. Id. at 617 n.1 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
20. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976). In Sierra, unlike
Andresen, the general catch-all clause at the end of the list apparently was not
limited to items related to a specifically described single offense.
21. 338 So. 2d at 613.
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their pre-search condition. Did these aspects of the officers'
conduct render the search unreasonable? What about the al-
leged assault upon Alfortish, apparently for purposes of learn-
ing where the items sought were secreted, and the alleged
assault upon Sierra, apparently for motives unrelated to com-
pleting the search successfully? Finally, the officers remained
on the premises after the search was completed but before
their return ride arrived. Did this constitute an improper ex-
tension of the duration of the search and, if so, did it render the
search unreasonable under the fourth amendment?
Easily imagined manipulation of the defense version of the
facts raises similar issues. The report of the case does not dis-
close the time when the search was conducted. If the search
had taken place at 3:00 A.M. and the police offered no justifica-
tion for that particular time, would the search be unreasonable?
Suppose the defense evidence tended to show that the officers,
without first identifying themselves and requesting admission,
had destroyed the door with an axe to secure rapid and sur-
prise entry. Would this, in the absence of justification, cause
the entry and search to violate fourth amendment standards?
If the officers had failed to note the seizure of the plants on
their return of the warrant, or if they had failed to make any
return at all, would the search, or perhaps only the seizure of
the plants, have been unconstitutional?
All of these actual and hypothetical claims of unconstitu-
tionality assume that the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment goes beyond requiring adequate justifica-
tion for a search and an adequately precise warrant. As the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted in responding to Sierra's argu-
ments, the case law is far from clear on these issues. 22 As the
next section illustrates, the United States Supreme Court has
offered only marginal help in analyzing these issues.
IlI. CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM
THE SUPREME COURT
Despite the numerous "means" issues law enforcement
conduct presents and the frequency with which they must
arise, the Supreme Court seldom has been inclined or com-
pelled to address them. In part, this infrequent treatment re-
sults from a variety of statutes which specifically address a
number of these problems. As the following discussion demon-
22. Id. at 615-16.
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strates, the Court has been uncritically willing to exclude evi-
dence in federal trials based on the investigating officers'
failure to follow federal statutory standards. Consequently, the
Coin t has frequently found no need to reach constitutional
questions in federal cases.
Probably the most direct suggestion that fourth amend-
ment reasonableness extends beyond the warrant and probable
cause requirements was contained in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia.23 Following an automobile accident involving Schmerber,
law enforcement authorities caused a physician at the hospital
where Schmerber was being treated to extract a blood sample
from him to determine its alcohol content.24 In addressing the
admissibility of the report resulting from chemical analysis of
the blood sample, the Court acknowledged that the extraction
of the blood constituted a "search" separate from the seizure of
Schmerber's person and an incidental search of his body that
did not involve intrusion beneath the surface of the skin.25 Ap-
plying the fourth amendment's requirement of adequate evi-
dence to justify a search, the Court held that a "clear
indication" that searchers would obtain evidence relevant to
guilt was necessary for a search involving an intrusion below
the surface of the body.26 On the facts of the case, the Court
concluded that the information constituting probable cause to
arrest satisfied this requirement.27 The Court also determined
that the officer reasonably could have believed that delaying
the search to obtain a warrant could have frustrated the search,
because the body would absorb some or all of the alcohol dur-
ing the delay. Thus the case came within the "exigent circum-
stances" or "emergency" exception to the demand of a
warrant.28
The Court went on to analyze both the reasonableness of
the officer's choice of a method to conduct the search and the
unreasonableness of manner in which that method was under-
taken on the facts of the case.2 9 Extraction and analysis of
blood samples, the Court noted, is a highly reliable method of
determining blood alcohol content. Moreover, the Court found
that such extractions are "commonplace" and involve "virtually
23. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
24. Id. at 758.
25. Id. at 769-70.
26. Id. at 770.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 770-71.
29. Id. at 771.
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no risk, trauma or pain," although the Court left undecided
whether a different conclusion would be required if the facts
showed that Schmerber, because of "fear," "health" or "reli-
gious scruple" found the extraction of blood more intrusive
than would most persons.30 In addition, the Court stressed that
the actual extraction of blood from Schmerber was accom-
plished by a physician in a hospital according to accepted med-
ical practices.3 1 The Court cautioned, however, that extraction
of blood by a police officer at a police station "might be to invite
an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain,"32
which by implication would render the manner of conducting
the extraction unreasonable.
Because the search was found reasonable, the Court's sug-
gestion that in other situations the manner of conducting a
search of a suspect's blood content would render it unreasona-
ble was dicta. The Schmerber dicta, however, strongly suggests
that the Court is willing, at least occasionally, to expand fourth
amendment reasonableness beyond the evidentiary and war-
rant requirements. In some situations, the method chosen to
effectuate the search may, by reason of the discomfort or risk
of injury, render the search unreasonable. Moreover, even a
method generally reasonable under this approach may be per-
formed in such a manner as to render the particular search
unreasonable.
In contrast to the Schmerber dicta, however, the Court has
been substantially less inclined to expand the reasonableness
analysis to scrutiny of the methods of search or seizure in
other contexts. Several areas bear specific examination.
A. PREMISES SEARCHES
Searches of buildings or premises are perhaps the "typical"
searches brought to mind when fourth amendment matters are
raised. When the premises at issue are residential, the
searches have been described by the Court as infringing upon a
particularly sensitive aspect of the privacy interests the fourth
amendment protects. 33 Despite this pronouncement of excep-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 772.
33. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (the Court
has traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices
for fourth amendment purposes; "warrantless examinations of automobiles
have been upheld in circumstances in which a search of home or office would
not."). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970) (warrantless search
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tional sensitivity to searches of premises, the Court has only
occasionally addressed manner-of-search questions in this
context.
1. Entry
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the sig-
nificance, if any, of the use of excessive force to gain entry to
premises to conduct a search, it has rendered decisions in sev-
eral cases raising the need to announce authority and purpose
prior to "breaking"34 to accomplish entry. These decisions,
however, leave the fourth amendment issue carefully
unresolved.
In Miller v. United States,35 federal officers entered a Dis-
trict of Columbia apartment by breaking a chain lock and over-
coming the occupant's resistance. The officers made no prior
announcement of their purpose to arrest one of the occupants
or demand for entry.36 Without carefully distinguishing be-
tween the validity of the entry and that of the arrest that fol-
lowed, the Court held that the applicable standards governing
entry to serve and execute a search warrant were those im-
posed by the law of the District of Columbia.37 The precedent
dealing with entry to make an arrest in the District of Colum-
bia circuit,38 the Court continued, had developed a standard
"substantially similar" to that imposed by a federal statute re-
garding entry to execute a search warrant.39 Under the federal
statute, an officer was authorized to "break" a door to obtain
entry only after giving notice of his authority and purpose and
after being denied entry.4 0 The Court traced the purpose of the
federal statute and the District of Columbia case law to a com-
mon law rule limiting authority of officers to break into a house
to effect an arrest,4 1 and found that in the case before it the of-
ficers had not provided the required notice.42 Because the facts
of residential premises unreasonable despite probable cause to believe defend-
ant had secreted drugs there and presence of defendant's mother and brother
on premises).
34. The Court has construed "breaking" quite broadly. See infra text ac-
companying note 60.
35. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
36. Id. at 303-04.
37. Id. at 305-06.
38. The Court relied specifically on Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456,
457-65 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See 357 U.S. at 306-11.
39. 357 U.S. at 306. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976).
40. 357 U.S. at 306 n.5.
41. Id. at 306-09.
42. Id. at 313.
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failed to show that the occupants were aware of the officers' au-
thority and purpose, there was no need to consider whether the
rule being applied permitted an exception in such situations.43
Neither Justice Brennan's majority opinion nor Justice
Clark's dissent suggests that the matter before the Court had
constitutional overtones. In addition, the Court did not address
the possibility that it could have held the evidence admissible
despite the violation of the common law requirement. 44
Stressing that the requirement being applied was "deeply
rooted in our heritage" and therefore should not be given
"grudging application," 45 the Court held the evidence located in
the search incident to the subsequent arrest inadmissible.46
Ker v. California47 appeared to present fourth amendment
issues regarding permissible entry, but the Court managed to
avoid explicitly addressing them. While under police surveil-
lance, Ker had apparently engaged in a drug transaction, and
officers pursued him until he disappeared after making a U-
turn in the middle of a block. The officers proceeded to Ker's
apartment, obtained a key from the building manager, and en-
tered by unlocking the apartment door. While in the living
room arresting Ker, the officers observed marijuana in the
kitchen through an open door. Both Ker and his wife were
charged and convicted of possession of marijuana.48
All members of the Ker Court, except Justice Harlan,
agreed that under Mapp v. Ohi049 the standards of reasonable-
ness imposed upon state law enforcement officers are the same
as those imposed directly upon federal officers by the fourth
amendment. In applying these standards, however, the Jus-
tices parted company. Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black,
Stewart and White, reasoned that the validity of the entry was
to be determined by California law, subject to the requirement
that no police action violative of the fourth amendment be au-
thorized by state law.5 0 The Court interpreted California law as
requiring prior announcement before entry, with an exception
43. Id. at 310.
44. The absence of notice, Justice Brennan concluded, rendered the arrest
"unlawful" and the seized evidence therefore should have been suppressed.
Id. at 313-14.
45. Id. at 313.
46. Id. at 313-14.
47. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
48. Id. at 26-29.
49. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See supra note 2.
50. 374 U.S. at 34 (opinion of Clark, J.).
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for "exigent circumstances." 5 1 Emphasizing that the officers
had reason to believe Ker was in possession of easily-destructi-
ble drugs and, on the basis of his U-turn, might be expecting
police, the result dictated by state law, that the absence of prior
announcement was excusable in this case, was within fourth
amendment limits.52 Justice Harlan concurred, reasoning that
state law enforcement conduct should be judged under a stan-
dard of "fundamental fairness" and that under this standard
the conduct of the California officers did not violate the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. 53
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Douglas and Goldberg, dissented. Justice Brennan found
a clear fourth amendment requirement of prior announcement,
subject only to certain exceptions. 5 4 Stressing the ambiguity of
the evidence Justice Clark relied upon to conclude that Ker
was aware police were approaching and was attempting to de-
stroy the drugs he possessed, Justice Brennan found no basis
for invoking any of the exceptions.55
Finally, in Sabbath v. United States,5 6 the Court addressed
the admissibility of evidence obtained in a search incident to
an arrest by federal officers. The officers had opened an un-
locked but closed door to gain entry to make an arrest.5 7
Speaking for eight members of the Court, Justice Marshall ac-
knowledged that the federal statute5 8 expressly dealt only with
entries to execute search warrants. Citing Miller, he explained
that entries to effect an arrest are to be tested by criteria iden-
tical to those in the statute.5 9 Although the statute by its terms
applied only to a "breaking" to gain entry, opening a closed
door was a breaking under the statute's language.60 Without
addressing whether an "exigent circumstances" exception
could be read into the federal statute, the majority noted that
51. Id. at 39 (opinion of Clark, J.).
52. Id. at 40-41 (opinion of Clark, J.).
53. Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
54. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
57. Id. at 587.
58. See supra text accompanying note 39.
59. 391 U.S. at 588. Justice Marshall referred to the "validity" of entries
without addressing whether the issue was of a constitutional, statutory or judi-
cial supervisory nature. See id.
60. Id. at 590. Justice Marshall reasoned, without citing authority, that the
statute was designed to proscribe unannounced intrusions into dwellings and
that entry by opening a closed but unlocked door was as much an intrusion as
entry accomplished by forcing open a locked door. Id.
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no facts were produced that would bring the case within any of
the exceptions that might be recognized. 6 1 Justice Marshall
cited Ker in a footnote and noted that exceptions to "any possi-
ble constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry"
have been recognized and might well be read into the federal
statute.62
These so-called "no-knock" cases reflect a clear sympathy
on the part of a majority of the Court for a requirement of ad-
vance notice prior to entry. This tendency is most evident in
the Court's willingness to extend the federal statutory require-
ment in Sabbath and its uncritical willingness, evident in both
Sabbath and Miller, to enforce a nonconstitutional advance no-
tice requirement with an exclusionary sanction. The cases also
reflect careful effort to avoid addressing the extent, if any, to
which the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness
embodies any such requirement. In Ker, this may have been
due in part to the majority's desire to find a role in the federal
standard for state and local search and arrest rules. It seems
likely, however, that this avoidance also reflects a perception
on the part of the Court that to accept an advance notice re-
quirement would be to expand the concept of fourth amend-
ment reasonableness beyond the warrant and evidentiary
requirements, a step the Court apparently believes should be
taken only when necessary and only after full consideration of
the long-run ramifications of the action.
Perhaps because of a conscious desire to avoid the fourth
amendment issue, the Court's discussions do not address the
possible relationship between the prior announcement require-
ment and fourth amendment interests. In Miller, the Court
characterized the breaking of a house door to effect an arrest as
61. Id. at 591.
62. Id. at 591 n.8. In Ker, the Court stated that it had held in Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that federal officers had failed to comply with
the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, in executing a warrantless arrest. 374 U.S.
at 40 n.11. Cf. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588 (1968) (officers re-
quired by statute to announce "authority and purpose" before "break[ing]" in
by opening a closed but unlocked door, citing Wong Sun). In Wong Sun, how-
ever, the issue was whether the arrestee's flight from the officer seeking admis-
sion constituted significant evidence of guilt bearing upon probable cause for
the subsequent arrest. In finding no probable cause, the Court reasoned that
where an officer fails to state his authority and purpose when seeking admis-
sion, the subject's flight must be regarded as "ambiguous conduct" adding little
or nothing to the information establishing probable cause. 371 U.S. at 482. Thus
Wong Sun does not address directly the different question of the independent
effect of a failure to announce upon the statutory or constitutional validity of
the officer's entry and the subsequent arrest.
[Vol. 67:89
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"invad[ing] the precious interest of privacy summed up in the
ancient adage that a man's house is his castle." 63 There is no
discussion, however, of the relationship of this aspect of pri-
vacy to those interests protected by the fourth amendment nor
of the manner in or extent to which a prior announcement re-
quirement would further fourth amendment interests. In a
later footnote, the Miller Court observed that compliance with
a prior announcement requirement also serves to safeguard po-
lice who might, in the absence of announcement, be mistaken
for prowlers and shot by a fearful householder.
64 The Court
might also have noted that compliance might further the safety
of others, including the occupants, by avoiding injuries from a
fracas that might result from unannounced entry. But there is
in fact no discussion in Miller, or in the other Supreme Court
decisions as to how, if at all, the fourth amendment serves the
purpose of minimizing violence during police activities. Al-
though the cases reflect the Court's obvious sympathy for a re-
quirement of prior announcement, the discussions make no
effort to relate the functions of such a requirement to those in-
terests the fourth amendment protects or ought to protect.
65
2. Timing of the Search: Nighttime Searches
Given the arguably greater intrusiveness of a search con-
ducted during nighttime hours, the fourth amendment might be
construed as protecting an interest in having otherwise legiti-
mate searches conducted only at "reasonable" times. The clos-
est the Court came to addressing the time of search issue was
63. 357 U.S. at 307.
64. Id. at 313 n.12 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61
(1948) (concurring opinion)).
65. Justice Brennan's opinion in Ker was a more direct effort to relate
prior announcement to fourth amendment interests. For example, he stressed
that prior announcement was required even before the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, 374 U.S. at 47, and that state and lower federal courts had also accepted
such a requirement, id. at 49-50. Turning to the historical abuses that gave rise
to the fourth amendment, Brennan acknowledged that the problems at issue
then were "not . . .exactly" ones of unannounced entry, id. at 51, but urged
that both the general warrant and unannounced entry "clearly invited common
abuses." Id. Then, in conclusory terms, he proclaimed that unannounced en-
tries, as well as nighttime entries, are "even more offensive to the sanctity and
privacy of the home" than announced and daytime entries. Id. at 52. Brennan
seemed willing to concede that not all procedural aspects of search and arrest
law are necessarily constitutional mandates, and asserted that the requirement
of prior announcement "is no mere procedural nicety or formality." Id. at 49.
Presumably, in Brennan's view, fourth amendment reasonableness does not
constitutionalize such "niceties" or "formalities," although he did not address
the criteria which distinguish them from the procedural requirements that are
incorporated into fourth amendment reasonableness.
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in Gooding v. United States,66 which involved the execution of
a search warrant. An affidavit submitted by a member of the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department indicated
that, upon the basis of an informer's report of purchases of her-
oin from Gooding at his apartment, the affiant was "positive"
that additional heroin was being concealed there.6 7 A search
warrant issued, authorizing the officers to make the search "at
any time in the day or night." The warrant was executed at
about 9:30 P.M., and the search resulted in discovery and
seizure of heroin and drug paraphernalia.
After his indictment on drug charges, Gooding moved for
suppression of the results of the search. He did not urge that
the nighttime search violated the fourth amendment, however.
Rather, Gooding argued only that the issuance of the warrant
did not comply with the applicable statutory provisions regard-
ing nighttime warrants.68 Consequently, the subsequent litiga-
tion did not directly raise any constitutional issues.
Nevertheless, the Court's handling of the case contains useful
indications of its attitude toward fourth amendment issues aris-
ing from the time at which a search is conducted.
The major task the Court confronted in Gooding was decid-
ing which of several statutory provisions governed the issuance
of the search warrant in that particular case. The alternative
statutory provisions differed significantly in the extent to which
they acknowledged that the subject of the search had an inter-
est in the time at which the search was conducted and, to the
extent that such an interest was acknowledged, in the manner
in which that interest was protected. Those which acknowl-
edged such an interest adopted widely varied mechanisms to
protect it. One provision of the District of Columbia Code
failed to recognize any interest in avoiding nighttime searches;
it authorized the issuing judge to insert in the warrant a direc-
tive that it could be served at any time during the day or
night.69 A second provision was the then-current version of
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 70 Rule 41
permitted the judge to authorize service of a warrant at any
66. 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
67. The affiant apparently anticipated the application of FED. R. Cumv. P. 41.
See infra text accompanying note 71.
68. Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Gooding v. United States, 416
U.S. 430 (1974). .
69. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-414 (1981).
70. The Rule has since been amended to require, for nighttime service, a
specific authorization in the warrant based upon "reasonable cause shown."
See FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(c).
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time, including the nighttime, if the affidavits supporting the
warrant established "positive [ly]" that the property to be
seized was on the premises. 7 1 This provision apparently recog-
nized a need to limit nighttime searches, but sought to circum-
scribe their availability only by manipulating the traditional
evidentiary requirement to require more evidence than is ordi-
narily needed to establish probable cause. A third possibility
was a general provision of the District of Columbia Code, which
required that search warrants be served in the daytime unless
the warrant authorized service at any time.72 Such authoriza-
tion was permitted upon a showing to the issuing judge that
service during the daytime was impossible, or that the property
sought was likely to be removed if the search was not immedi-
ately made in the nighttime, or that the property sought was
not likely to be found on the premises except during the night-
time. This provision sought to minimize nighttime intrusions
by imposing a specific requirement that a judicial officer assess
the adequacy of the justification for the execution of the war-
rant in the nighttime before the search could take place. A
fourth alternative was a federal statute which permitted the is-
suance of a search warrant for controlled substances at any
time, including nighttime, if the issuing authority "[was] satis-
fied that there [was] probable cause to believe that ground ex-
ist[ed] for the warrant and for its service at such time."73 The
meaning of this section was unclear and depended largely upon
the construction given the requirement of "probable cause to
believe that grounds exist[ed] for ... service [of the warrant]
at [nighttime]." If the section were construed to require more
than probable cause to believe the seizable items would be on
the premises during the nighttime, it would recognize and
might to some extent protect the subject's interest in being free
of the exceptional intrusiveness of a nighttime search.
A six-member majority of the Court resolved the case by
employing general tenets of statutory construction and gave no
indication that there were constitutional overtones. The Court
took this approach despite a vigorous dissent by Justice Mar-
shall, who expressed the view that the fourth amendment pro-
tects against unjustified execution of search warrants in the
nighttime and requires a showing of specific justification for
such timing of the search.74 Although Justice Marshall ac-
71. See FED. R. Cami. P. 41(c).
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-521(f) (5) (1981).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1976).
74. 416 U.S. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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knowledged the constitutional issue "[was] not presented in
this case and need not be resolved,"75 he urged that constitu-
tional considerations be taken into account in addressing the
statutory construction issues presented by the case.76
The opinion of the Court evinces no sensitivity to or ac-
knowledgement of constitutional considerations. Relying on
the proposition that more specific statutes should be preferred
over general ones, and pointing to the apparent intent of Con-
gress to maximize the number of law enforcement agencies
that could utilize congressionally-provided weapons against
drug traffic, the majority concluded that the federal statute gov-
erned the issuance of the warrant.7 7 In probing the meaning of
this statute,78 the majority compared the statutory language
with language used by Congress in other provisions in which
Congress clearly intended to impose special requirements for
nighttime searches. 79 The majority found Congress's failure to
use the specific language used in the other statutes and the ap-
parent congressional intent to facilitate attack upon drug abuse
determinative, and concluded that the statute "requires no spe-
cial showing for a nighttime search, other than a showing that
the contraband is likely to be on the property ... to be
searched at that time."8 0
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, urging that the restrictive provision of the District of
75. Id.
76. Id. at 462.
77. Id. at 446-54.
78. See supra text accompanying note 73.
79. The Court relied upon both the provision of the District of Columbia
Code and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 416 U.S. at 456.
80. Id. at 458. The government argued, in the alternative, that even if the
warrant was issued without compliance with the applicable statute, exclusion
of the resulting evidence was necessary. Brief for Respondent at 52-59, Good-
ing v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974). The government contended that there
was no fourth amendment violation which would bring Mapp v. Ohio into play,
id. at 52, and that the "considerations of justice" which control whether the
Court's supervisory powers dictate suppression were inapplicable because non-
compliance with the applicable statute was the fault of the issuing magistrate
rather than the executing officers. Id. at 54. Despite this invitation, Gooding
did not respond with an argument that urged fourth amendment considerations
to support suppression. Rather, he argued that in applying the exclusionary
sanction no distinctions should be drawn among reasons for a search warrant's
invalidity. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S.
430 (1974). No effort was made to suggest that not all failures to follow statu-
tory requirements should require suppression, or to define which such failures
should have exclusionary results. Thus, at virtually the last minute, counsel for
Gooding ignored a final opportunity to inject at least some fourth amendment
overtones into the argument.
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Columbia Code be held applicable.8 1 The same three justices,
in a dissent authored by Justice Marshall, argued that if the
majority's view that the federal statute applied was to prevail,
the statute should be read to require an additional showing of
justification for a nighttime search above and beyond the show-
ing of probable cause, in light of the privacy and constitutional
implications involved.82 Because both the first portion of the
statute and the fourth amendment require a showing of prob-
able cause to believe the contraband will be on the premises
prior to issuance of the warrant, Justice Marshall maintained
that the majority's construction rendered the final clause of the
statute, which requires probable cause for service in the night-
time, "totally without meaning."8 3
Although Gooding can be regarded as a case in which the
Court took the issues as framed by the litigation below with no
constitutional overtones, this reading is too limited. The major-
ity's failure to acknowledge that, despite the limited nature of
the issue in the case before it, the subject area has significant
constitutional ramifications strongly suggests hostility toward
the proposition that fourth amendment reasonableness might
address the timing of searches, including those conducted pur-
suant to warrants.
3. Conclusion
The Court's treatment of nighttime searches in Gooding is
in sharp contrast to its prior announcement decisions. Good-
ing demonstrated an almost total lack of sensitivity to potential
fourth amendment significance of the timing of a search. The
prior announcement cases, on the other hand, suggest a strong
sympathy for that requirement as a matter of policy, reflected
in an uncritical willingness to enforce statutory formulations of
the requirement by an exclusionary sanction. Curiously, how-
ever, the Court has avoided addressing the extent to which the
fourth amendment imposes any limitations upon the manner in
which officers gain entry to effect a search. As a result, it re-
mains unclear whether the fourth amendment ever requires
prior announcement, whether the amendment imposes any lim-
its upon deceptive techniques that may be used to gain entry,
and, more specifically, whether the use of force beyond that
81. See 416 U.S. at 460-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting); supra text accompany-
ing note 72.




necessary to obtain entrance will render the entry and ensuing
search unreasonable in constitutional terms.
B. SEIZURES OF ITEMS
The Court has made clear that the exercise of dominion
over an item in such a way as to interfere with a subject's
rights in it is a "seizure" of that item and consequently must be
reasonable under the fourth amendment. The seizure may be
part of an effort to engage in further search, as in United States
v. Chadwick84 and Arkansas v. Sanders,85 in which officers
seized a footlocker and suitcase, respectively, with the inten-
tion of inspecting their contents and seizing controlled sub-
stances the officers expected to find inside. Alternatively, the
seizure may be merely to maintain possession of the items for
their evidentiary value, as in Warden v. Hayden,8 6 or for other
law enforcement purposes, such as subjecting the items to for-
feiture proceedings, as in Cooper v. California.8 7 If the seizure
can be made without any preliminary "search," the Court ap-
parently requires no warrant,88 although Coolidge v. New
84. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
85. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
86. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
87. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
88. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-96 (1974). If it is the
Court's belief that seizures are exempt from the warrant requirements, the ra-
tionale for this position is not clear. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338, 351 (1977), the Court commented that seizure of automobiles located
in public places "did not involve any invasion of privacy." But the Court could
not have meant that this aspect removed the action from fourth amendment
coverage; the terms of the amendment itself preclude this interpretation. The
Court's further discussion suggests that the warrantless seizure of the
automobiles at issue in G.M. Leasing was justified by the government's right to
collect taxes and other debts due it by summary proceedings. See id. at 352
n.18. To the extent that this is the rationale for the holding, the case is inappli-
cable to most investigatory seizures.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971), Justice Stewart
attempted to explain the rule according to his understanding of the amend-
ment's primary purpose in protecting against searches. The functions of the
warrant clause, Stewart urged, are to prevent searches on less than probable
cause and to limit permissible searches. The plain view seizure rule does not
conflict with these objectives, because it applies only when a search is either
unnecessary or is otherwise justified and it does not expand the scope of the
search. This analysis ignores the value of the warrant requirement in assuring
that "seizures," as contrasted with searches, are "reasonable" in fourth amend-
ment terms.
Professor Grano defends the rule primarily on the ground that seizures in-
trude significantly less than searches upon protected fourth amendment inter-
ests and that this justifies relaxation of the limits imposed upon seizures. See
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requiremen 19 AM. CPai.
L. REV. 603, 647-48 (1982). In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), Chad-
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Hampshire89 suggests that the right to make a "plain view" and
warrantless seizure may apply only when the officers come
upon the item "inadvertently."90 Regardless of the situation,
however, the fourth amendment clearly requires that officers
have probable cause to believe the item is subject to seizure.
Officers may make seizures during a search conducted under
the authority of a warrant, during a warrantless search, or
under circumstances in which the item is so situated that no
pre-seizure "search" is involved.
At least two aspects of seizures, in addition to the require-
ment of probable cause or other sufficient evidence and the
need for a warrant, raise questions of fourth amendment rea-
sonableness: the duration of a seizure and the return on a
search warrant.
1. Duration of Seizures
Even if a law enforcement officer acts reasonably in taking
control of an item during a search, the continued assertion of
control over the item may become unreasonable because of its
length. To the extent that one's possessory or control interest
is increasingly infringed as one's property remains in official
wick had a large footlocker in his possession at the time of the incident at is-
sue. In commenting upon his interests, the Court indicated that "a search of
the interior [of the footlocker] was ... a far greater intrusion into Fourth
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker." Id. at 13 n. 8. It
is not clear why seizures should be regarded as less intrusive than searches or
why the difference should be regarded as sufficiently large to render the major
procedural aspect of "reasonableness" inapplicable to searches. See Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (whether search of a car or seizure of it
until warrant is obtained is a greater intrusion upon interests protected by
fourth amendment is "debatable" and "may depend upon a variety of circum-
stances"). Elsewhere, Grano has argued that searches tend more than seizures
to permit authorities to discern hidden thoughts and to find hidden posses-
sions, major concerns of the amendment. Letter from Joseph D. Grano to
George E. Dix (July 15, 1982). Some searches are intrusive largely because of
their interference with use of the searched property and some seizures may as-
sist the government in the kind of inquiries Grano regards as being at the fore-
front of fourth amendment concern, however.
Perhaps the distinction can be defended on grounds of exigency. In almost
every case, seizure of an item in plain view will also fal within an "exigent cir-
cumstances" exception to any applicable warrant requirement. If this is cor-
rect, a general rule requiring a warrant may be undesirable because no general
rule should be recognized which applies to fewer cases than its exceptions. Cf.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (In
plain view seizure situations, "it would often be a needless inconvenience, and
sometimes dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves-to require
them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant.").
89. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
90. See id. at 466-70.
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custody, the longer the duration of custody, the greater the in-
trusion upon protected interests. Moreover, continued custody
of an item may serve no legitimate law enforcement interest,
because any required search, inspection, or testing of the item
can conceivably be done with dispatch. Consequently, the jus-
tification for the initial seizure may disappear as the detention
continues.
The case law contains little support, however, for the view
that fourth amendment reasonableness requires that the dura-
tion of a seizure be limited by the purpose of that seizure. In
Chambers v. Maroney,91 for example, the Court held that a re-
cently stopped vehicle that was subject to search could be de-
tained for later movement to the police station in order to
conduct the search there. Although the result in Chambers ar-
guably turned upon the practical difficulty of safely conducting
a field search in that particular situation,9 2 Texas v. White93 ap-
pears to have dispensed with any need to justify a decision to
assume custody of a vehicle for movement to the stationhouse
for search.
The only support for a fourth amendment limitation upon
the duration of a seizure appears in Justice White's dissent in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.94 Police seized Coolidge's auto-
mobile because there was probable cause to believe it had been
used to transport the victim of a homicide. Searches of the ve-
hicle conducted immediately after its seizure and eleven and
fourteen months later revealed incriminating information. A
plurality of the Court found Chambers inapplicable because
there had been no right to conduct a warrantless search of the
automobile where it was found.95 Unlike the automobile in
Chambers, Coolidge's car was not recently stopped and thus
not sufficiently movable to invoke the exception to the warrant
requirement, and consequently, the police had no right to
search that continued through the movement of the car to the
station. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented
on the ground that the car was evidence of Coolidge's guilt
which the officers came upon in "plain sight" and could there-
fore seize, retain, and search.96 Explaining his unwillingness to
rely on Chambers, Justice White suggested that Chambers con-
91. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
92. See id. at 51.
93. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
94. 403 U.S. at 510.
95. Id. at 463 n.20.
96. Id. at 510, 521 (White, J., dissenting).
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templates "some expedition" in completing the search at the
stationhouse so the automobile can be released and returned to
its owners. Even if under Chambers the officer validly seized
the car and moved it to the stationhouse for search rather than
searching it at Coolidge's home, Justice White concluded that
the retention of the car for over a year rendered its seizure un-
reasonable and that the searches conducted by virtue of this
retention were thus necessarily tainted.97 Despite Justice
White's views, however, there is little support in Supreme
Court decisions for the proposition that citizens have an inter-
est protected by the fourth amendment in having any seizure,
valid at its inception, limited to a duration reasonably related
to the purpose of the seizure.
2. Return on a Warrant
A related matter involves the fourth amendment reasona-
bleness of an officer's failure to make a complete and accurate
return on a warrant. Local requirements for search warrants
generally include a requirement that the executing officer make
a return to the issuing court or judge and file an inventory of
the items seized with the court.9 8 This requirement serves sev-
eral functions. To some extent, the return requirement ac-
quaints the issuing judge with the facts of the search and any
seizures that took place. This knowledge may alert the judge to
improprieties that might not otherwise come to the judge's at-
tention. In addition, the inventory and return serve to docu-
ment the seizures made, to subject the items to the control of
the court, to maximize the opportunity of the owners of the
items rapidly to contest the validity of the seizures and, if the
seizures are determined to be invalid, to secure the return of
the property. Thus the return might be viewed as a procedural
means of assisting subjects of searches to minimize the dura-
tion of improper seizures of their property.
In the one case in which the Supreme Court has been con-
fronted with a search warrant return issue, Cady v. Dombrow-
ski,99 the issue was summarily dismissed. In Dombrowski,
officers secured a warrant to search an automobile for evidence
97. Id. at 523.
98. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.4 commentary
(Official Draft 1975). Although statutes providing for a return generally do not
prescribe in any detail what is necessary, the need for an inventory of seized
property "is well-nigh universal." Id. at 517. Several states also require a
description of the process of execution of the warrant. Id.
99. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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relating to a homicide investigation. The judge also issued an
oral order authorizing officers to seize the car. That evening,
the vehicle was towed to the sheriff's garage and searched,
either before being moved or at the garage. Police prepared an
inventory the same evening listing a number of items seized
from the car. The inventory was not filed, however, until the
next day, when the issuing judge held a hearing on the return.
That morning, before the hearing, an employee of the State
Crime Laboratory conducted another examination of the auto-
mobile in the sheriff's garage. During this examination, the
searcher assumed custody of a white sock and a portion of a
floor mat. These items were not listed on the return prepared
earlier but filed after the laboratory employee's examination.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, after rejecting other offered justi-
fications for the laboratory employee's inspection and seizure,
examined the possibility that his actions might be authorized
by the search warrant. 0 0 The court rejected this possibility on
the basis that the warrant authorized a single search which was
complete before the laboratory employee made his inspection.
In reaching this conclusion, the court assumed, erroneously,
that the return on the warrant had been filed, rather than
merely prepared, before the employee's inspection and, cor-
rectly, that the fruits of the employee's inspection were not in-
cluded in the return.' 0'
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the return
was not filed until after the laboratory employee's inspection.
The Court reasoned that the seizure of the sock arid floor mat
occurred while a valid search warrant was outstanding and
thus the warrant justified the search for and seizure of these
items. 02 As to the failure to include these items in the return,
the Court stated, without discussion and without citing any au-
thority, that "we do not deem it constitutionally significant that
they were not listed in the return of the warrant. The ramifica-
tion of that 'defect,' if such it was, is purely a question of state
law.' 03 The four dissenters took the position that remand was
necessary to determine whether the search of the car was the
"fruit" of what they regarded as an invalid earlier search, and
therefore did not reach the impact of the incomplete return. 04
The significance of Dombrowski should not be underesti-
100. Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1972).
101. Id.
102. 413 U.S. at 449.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 454 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mated. The case apparently constitutes a flat rejection of the
view that fourth amendment reasonableness incorporates, at
least to some extent, the major postsearch aspect of traditional
search warrant law-the requirement of an accurate return.
Moreover, the Court apparently adopted this position without
an exploration of the interests the return requirement protects
and the extent to which those interests are or should be pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. The offhand manner in which
the Court rejected the argument suggests that the majority re-
garded the claim as bordering upon frivolous.
3. Conclusion
Although the reasonableness of a seizure might depend
upon the length of time the state exercises control over an
item, the Supreme Court's decisions provide little support for
this possibility. This absence of support may explain the
Court's failure in Dombrowski to consider the possible func-
tions the return process might serve and the relationship of
those functions to interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Regardless of the propriety of the Court's result, its
analysis grossly oversimplifies the issue.
C. DETENTIONS OF THE PERSON
The Supreme Court has recognized that detentions of the
person constitute "seizures" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment and must be "reasonable" in fourth amendment
terms. 0 5 The Court's decisions have attempted to distinguish
at least six different types of detentions: arrests, 106 field stops
for interrogation, 0 7 stationhouse investigatory detentions,108
investigatory detentions at fixed checkpoints in reasonable
proximity to the international border,109 detentions at the scene
105. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (detention to conduct a
frisk for weapons); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (arrest).
106. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959). The Court
has never identified the distinguishing characteristic of an arrest. Specifically,
it has not determined whether some detentions are from their inception "ar-
rests" because of the officer's intention to bring formal charges against the sub-
ject. Under the analysis of at least some courts, the officer's intent appears to
be the controlling consideration. See, e.g., State v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St. 2d 22, 26,
412 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (1980) ("an arrest, in the technical, as well as the common
sense, signifies the apprehension of an individual or the restraint of a person's
freedom in contemplation of the formal charging with a crime.").
107. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
108. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
109. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
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of execution of a search warrant,110 and grand jury appear-
ances.111 Unlike searches, the Court has generally exempted
detentions of the person from the warrant requirement.112
Therefore, to find a detention of the person is reasonable, the
Court usually has required only that the detention be sup-
ported by adequate evidence. In defining the amount of evi-
dence required, the Court has referred to the distinctions set
out above. Arrests must be supported by "probable cause,"1 13
while field stops for investigation require only "reasonable sus-
picion."1 4 Fixed checkpoint detentions and grand jury appear-
ances, on the other hand, are exempted from any evidentiary
requirement of reasonableness. 115
Detentions of the person present perhaps even more op-
portunities than searches of premises and seizures of items for
the Court to consider characteristics other than the existence
of adequate evidence to justify the intrusion and the warrant
process's role in establishing the adequacy of this evidence.
Again, however, there are few explicit discussions of these is-
sues in Supreme Court opinions, and the signals in the deci-
sions are inconsistent and conflicting.
1. Stationhouse Investigatory Detentions: The Davis Dicta
In Davis v. Mississippi,"16 the Court held that the police
unreasonably detained Davis and moved him to the sta-
tionhouse to obtain fingerprints. The unreasonable detention
and movement required suppression of subsequently devel-
oped evidence. Although dicta in Justice Brennan's majority
opinion suggested that under certain "narrowly-defined" cir-
cumstances such detention would be reasonable upon less than
traditional probable cause, the dicta also suggested a willing-
ness to define those circumstances in part according to the
means used to accomplish the detention and investigation.
Noting the absence of any danger that fingerprints would be de-
stroyed, the Court stated that "the detention need not come un-
110. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981).
111. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-24 (1976) (fourth
amendment does not require warrant for arrest in a public place, despite op-
portunity to obtain warrant).
113. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959).
114. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
115. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (check-
point detentions); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (grand jury
appearances).
116. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
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expectedly or at an inconvenient time."" 7 In the case before it,
the Court observed, with apparent disapproval, that Davis had
been compelled to undergo interrogation as well as fingerprint-
ing during his detention.118 This observation suggests that de-
tention for fingerprinting on less than probable cause is
constitutionally acceptable only if the police are barred from
taking advantage of the suspect's presence for other purposes.
Davis had been detained for fingerprinting twice on occasions
nearly ten days apart. On the first occasion he was apparently
released promptly. The second detention, however, lasted
three days, and the fingerprints were not taken until the third
day. The Court did not address whether the length of the sec-
ond detention might have exceeded what would be acceptable
under the Constitution, but did stress that requiring him to
submit to a second detention, for no apparent reason, consti-
tuted a deviation from fourth amendment limitations. 119
Although Davis presents an unremarkable holding, the
dicta contains a fascinating comment by the Court that, given
what it perceives as the extreme reliability of fingerprint evi-
dence 120 and its ability to apply the warrant requirement to de-
tentions for fingerprinting,12l even stationhouse detentions for
this purpose might be acceptable if made upon less than prob-
able cause. In an apparent tradeoff for this relaxation of the
probable cause requirement the Court expressed a willingness
to expand the fourth amendment to impose certain require-
ments concerning the manner in which such detentions are im-
plemented: the detention must be preceded by notice, to avoid
intrusive surprise; certain unexplained limits must be placed
on the time the detention is implemented, to avoid the intru-
117. Id. at 727.
118. Id. at 728.
119. Id.
120. "[F]ingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-
solving tool than eyewitness identification or confessions." Id. at 727.
121. "[B]ecause there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints . . .the
general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in
advance of detention would seem not to admit of any exception in the finger-
print context." Id. at 727-28. It is unclear, given the holding in United States v.
Watson, 413 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976), that no warrant is necessary for an arrest,
what "general requirement" of a warrant Justice Brennan had in mind. More-
over, Justice Brennan's suggestion that exigent circumstances will never exist
and therefore the Court need not recognize an exception to the warrant re-
quirement is simplistic. Even if fingerprints are not destructible, a suspect who
is aware that his fingerprints are incriminating may, rather than submit to the
procedure, remove his intact fingerprints, fingers, and the remainder of his
body from the jurisdiction. It appears that at least portions of the "Davis dicta"
were not particularly well-conceived.
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sive inconvenience of detentions effected at certain times; dur-
ing the detention, officers must be barred from using the
opportunity presented by the suspect's presence for other in-
vestigatory techniques, such as questioning; and the detention
must be a single one, at least in the absence of justification for
repeated detentions. This indication of a willingness to read
broadly the requirement of reasonableness stands in interest-
ing contrast to the Court's reticence in other areas related to
detentions of the person.
2. Durations of Detentions
There are substantial indications that a detention of the
person, valid at its onset, may become "unreasonable" under
the fourth amendment because of its duration. Although this
possibility is raised most directly by investigatory detentions
upon less than probable cause, there are some signals that sug-
gest a similar issue may be raised by a traditional arrest upon
probable cause.
a. Nonarrest Detentions
Although the Court has never attempted definitively to dis-
tinguish arrests from those detentions that are at least initially
valid despite the absence of probable cause, it appears likely
that the duration of the detention is a major distinguishing fac-
tor. In other words, an investigatory detention upon less than
probable cause may not last as long as an arrest. The Court
has not expressly held that the duration factor is the basis for
distinguishing different kinds of detentions, however, and its
discussions provide little basis for giving that assumption much
specific content. In United States v. Martinez-Fuetre,122 for ex-
ample, which upheld "random" stops of vehicles at fixed check-
points, the majority repeatedly emphasized that only "stops for
brief questioning"123 and "brief detention [s] "124 are authorized.
The facts before the Court required no elaboration upon the
meaning of "brief," however, and the majority offered no useful
discussion on this point.
Dunaway v. New York125 addressed the issue more defi-
nitely. Officers with "reasonable suspicion" but less than
"probable cause" to believe Dunaway was involved in a rob-
122. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
123. Id. at 566.
124. Id. at 558.
125. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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bery-murder took him into custody at a neighbor's house,
transported him to the stationhouse, and began questioning
that resulted in his making statements and drawing sketches
which implicated him in the offense. The first incriminating
statement was made within an hour of the initiation of the in-
terrogation. 126 Although the officers apparently had probable
cause to believe Dunaway was involved in the crime once this
statement was made, a majority of the Court found the state-
ments and sketches inadmissible, and held that the officers "vi-
olated the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments when, without
probable cause, they seized [Dunaway] and transported him to
the police station for interrogation."'127 This language does not
specify, however, the fatal error in the officers' course of con-
duct and the point at which the detention of Dunaway became
unreasonable under the fourth amendment. It is unclear
whether the fatal defect was the officers' detention of Dunaway
for at least an hour on the basis of only "reasonable suspicion,"
movement of Dunaway from the scene of the detention to the
stationhouse, beginning interrogation during the detention at
the stationhouse, initially detaining Dunaway with the inten-
tion of moving him to the stationhouse, and perhaps question-
ing him there, or some combination of these factors. Despite
the majority's failure to indicate the error, a reasonable reading
of the Court's opinion suggests, at a minimum, that an investi-
gatory detention in the field upon less than probable cause be-
comes unreasonable after an hour, at least when during that
period the subject has been moved from the field to a sta-
tionhouse and subjected to interrogation. Under this reading,
the duration of the detention is relevant to the fourth amend-
ment reasonableness of the detention, although not necessarily
independently controlling.
b. Arrests
The signals from the Court regarding the permissible dura-
tion of arrests are few and confusing. The major suggestion
that reasonableness may limit the duration of an arrest is a
comment by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Gus-
tafson v. Florida.128 Gustafson upheld the right of arresting of-
ficers to make a search of an arrestee's person, at least when
the "arrest" is a detention intended to result in the subject's
126. Id. at 203 n.2.
127. Id. at 216.
128. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
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transfer to the stationhouse and formal booking on the
charge.129 Gustafson was arrested for operating a vehicle with-
out a valid operator's permit in his possession. Although the
defense did not attack the validity of the arrest itself, Justice
Stewart suggested that "a persuasive claim" might have been
made that, given the minor nature of the offense at issue, the
custodial arrest necessary to support an incidental search of
the subject's person was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment.130
Basically, Justice Stewart's contention was that in those
situations in which the offense implicates no serious public in-
terest, an initially valid detention which lasts longer than is
necessary to issue a summons or "ticket," and perhaps to ob-
tain some assurance that the suspect will appear to answer the
charges, becomes unreasonable because of its duration. Justice
Stewart's discussion contains no indication that he recognized
that the "claim" he was inviting would involve a substantial ex-
pansion of the nature of fourth amendment limitations upon ar-
rest-type detentions.
The most significant signal that Justice Stewart misread
the fourth amendment's implications regarding the duration of
arrests is the Court's failure to acknowledge any fourth amend-
ment significance in the widespread requirement that an ar-
rested person be presented before a judicial officer without
significant delay. One of the functions of this appearance is the
determination of the conditions for pretrial release or deten-
tion. This function is somewhat analogous to that of the return
on a search warrant. Both subject the "products" of the police
action, the items seized or the person detained, to judicial su-
pervision and thus provide the framework for terminating or
modifying the seizure or detention even if that action was ini-
tially valid. If the duration of an arrestee's detention pursuant
to a valid arrest triggers fourth amendment concerns, it is quite
likely that the presentation of an arrestee before a magistrate,
the vehicle for limiting the duration of that detention, also has
fourth amendment significance.
In the relatively long period in which the Court has consid-
ered the significance of the federal requirement of prompt pres-
entation, the Court has never explicitly suggested that this
requirement has fourth amendment overtones. In McNabb v.
129. See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (arrest for
operating a vehicle after revocation of an operator's permit).
130. 414 U.S. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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United States,131 for example, federal officers arrested the de-
fendants and detained them without the prompt presentation
before a magistrate required by then-effective federal stat-
utes.132 During this detention, the officers elicited certain in-
criminating statements from the defendants. Exercising its
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts, 133 the Court held that effectuation of the
congressional policy embodied in the statute's prompt presen-
tation provisions134 mandated the exclusion of confessions ob-
tained during a period of custody that followed a failure to
present the defendants before a magistrate as required by law.
The majority's discussion of the importance of the prompt pres-
entation requirement reflects no consideration that the require-
ment may serve to limit the duration of an arrest that was valid
at the onset.135 Rather, the Court stressed that prompt presen-
tation "checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as
the 'third degree.' "136 The Court did not specifically describe
the manner in which it perceived this check as being accom-
plished. The Justices may have meant that prompt presenta-
tion facilitates pretrial release, which in turn eliminates the
possibility of custodial interrogation that may invite coercion.
Alternatively, it may have assumed that presentation before a
judicial officer subjects the accused, even if still in custody, to
some protective supervision of the judge and thus discourages
officers from resorting to impermissible tactics during subse-
quent interrogation of the arrestee after continued detention.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the majority
gave no evidence that the prompt presentation requirement is
important because it provides for pretrial liberty of a person
whose arrest was unquestionably valid.
In Upshaw v. United States,137 the McNabb exclusionary
remedy was applied to the prompt presentation requirement
incorporated into Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Again, neither the majority's discussion nor that of
the four dissenters reflected any fourth amendment concern.
Relying on testimony given by the arresting officer, the major-
ity added to the ambiguity surrounding the manner in which
131. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
132. Id. at 342.
133. Id. at 341.
134. Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 343-44.
136. Id. at 344.
137. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
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prompt presentation is to check the use of "third degree" meth-
ods. The officer in Upshaw had specifically acknowledged his
concern that if the defendant were presented, the magistrate
would release him. The officer added that, even if the magis-
trate "held" the defendant, "we would lose custody of him and I
no longer would be able to question him."' 38 Whether the
Court regarded prompt presentation as a valuable device for
securing release from improper custody or as a method of im-
posing judicial supervision upon presumably proper custody
remained unclear after Upshaw. The Court did not resolve this
ambiguity in Mallory v. United States,139 which held that delay
for purposes of interrogation is "unnecessary delay" within the
meaning of Rule 5(a), which requires exclusion of statements
obtained during the questioning. Some of the Court's discus-
sion in Mallory, however, suggests that the rationale for reli-
ance upon Rule 5(a) may be its value in facilitating the
determination of probable cause at the preliminary hearing,
and thus in securing the release of a person whose detention is
not in fact supported by probable cause. 140
Although the Court has never directly confronted the issue,
it has nonetheless implied that the Constitution does not man-
date the McNabb-Mallory rule and consequently, that confes-
sions obtained during delay in presenting a state defendant
before a judicial officer need not be excluded from state crimi-
nal proceedings. In the Court's classic articulation of the vol-
untariness test for determining the admissibility of confessions,
Columbe v. Connecticut,141 the Court emphasized that "undue
delay in arraignment" is not a controlling consideration in de-
termining the admissibility of a confession.142
The significance to be given these decisions is unclear. The
Court could have reasoned in McNabb, Upshaw and Mallory
that the fourth amendment requires that detention following an
initially valid arrest be no longer than necessary to implement
the government's interests and that prompt presentation of an
arrested person is constitutionally necessary to implement this
requirement. Consequently, the Court might have concluded
that the officers' failure to present the defendant requires ex-
clusion of any confession obtained after an unreasonable delay
138. Id. at 414.
139. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
140. Id. at 454.
141. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
142. Id. at 601.
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in presentation, under Weeks v. United States.14 3 The availabil-
ity of a nonconstitutional basis for the same result may explain
the Court's failure to invoke this reasoning. Development of an
exclusionary rule through the Court's supervisory power, how-
ever, is an extreme exercise of judicial authority.144 The Court
might more appropriately have relied upon any available con-
stitutional ground than upon its supervisory jurisdiction. On
the other hand, the Court may have perceived difficulty in re-
lating confessions, the evidence at issue, to any fourth amend-
ment violation. Although Weeks clearly committed the Court to
a fourth amendment exclusionary rule in federal criminal tri-
als, the Court did not, until Wong Sun v. United States,145 ac-
cept the proposition that "verbal evidence" such as a
confession could be the excludable "fruit" of a detention viola-
tive of the fourth amendment.146 Despite these possible expla-
nations for the absence of fourth amendment consideration in
the McNabb-Mallory line of cases, however, the opinions most
likely reflect an assumption that prompt presentation has no
fourth amendment significance.
Gerstein v. Pugh 4 7 suggests, on first impression, that the
Court's perception may have changed. In Gerstein, the Court
held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments entitle a state
defendant, arrested without a warrant and not indicted by a
grand jury, to a timely judicial determination of probable cause
for the detention. The decision is based, however, upon effectu-
ation of the subject's fourth amendment right not to be ar-
rested initially in the absence of probable cause. This basis is
made evident by the Court's recognition that no judicial prob-
able cause determination is necessary when a subject is ar-
rested pursuant to a warrant, issued upon a prior
determination of probable cause,148 or when a grand jury has
indicted the subject and in the process determined that prob-
able cause exists.14 9 Under Gerstein, the judicial determination
must address only the basis for the initial detention, i.e., prob-
able cause, and need not incorporate any justification for re-
143. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks held that evidence seized during an unlaw-
ful search must be excluded from federal trials. Id. at 398. See also cases cited
supra note 3.
144. See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 434-36 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
145. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
146. Id. at 485.
147. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
148. Id. at 116 n.18.
149. Id. at 117 n.19.
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taining the subject in custody. In other words, Gerstein does
not address the extent to which an arrested person's detention
upon probable cause may become unreasonable because it con-
tinues longer than is necessary to effectuate the state's pur-
pose. Defendant's interest in minimizing the post-arrest
detention period apparently was not at issue in Gerstein. Nev-
ertheless, the Court's failure to distinguish such an interest
suggests that the Court is inclined toward a reading of fourth
amendment reasonableness that excludes this interest from
protection.
3. Movement and Other Investigatory Techniques
During Detention
The suggestion in Davis that stationhouse detentions upon
less than probable cause would be acceptable only if officers
were prevented from using the detention period as a vehicle for
undertaking other investigatory techniques raises the question
whether similar prohibitions against such techniques might be
imposed in different situations. Unfortunately, the cases pro-
vide no ready answer to this question.
As observed earlier, the Court's condemnation of the de-
tention in Dunaway may have been based in part on the rela-
tion of the detention to custodial interrogation.150 It is unclear,
however, whether the actual questioning or the officer's inten-
tion to use the detention for questioning rendered the deten-
tion impermissible. In Martinez-Fuerte, on the other hand, the
Court upheld checkpoint stops, stressing that detentions at
checkpoints involve only a stop, "brief' questioning, and visual
inspection of the interior of the vehicle from the outside.' 5 '
These cases suggest that the Court has assumed the existence
of affirmative prohibitions against other intrusive techniques.
At least some of these techniques, such as a thorough search of
the vehicle,152 seem also to be barred by independent
considerations.
A possible reason for the ambiguity in this area is the
Court's failure to address the relationship between custody and
efforts to interrogate. Miranda v. Arizona 53 and its progeny154
assume the propriety of custodial interrogation during post-ar-
150. 442 U.S. 200, 211-12 (1979).
151. 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
152. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897-98 (1975) (search of trunk of
automobile at fixed checkpoint unreasonable because officers lacked probable
cause to believe car contained illegal aliens).
153. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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rest periods of detention. 55 On the other hand, the Davis dicta
suggest that interrogation may be constitutionally prohibited
during certain other types of detention. The rationale for this
distinction is not clear. Perhaps the nature of the type of situa-
tion in Davis creates a greater risk of improper influences upon
defendants than that presented by custodial interrogation fol-
lowing arrest. If this is true, however, the interest at risk might
be better protected by focusing on the admissibility of any re-
sulting confessions, rather than on the validity of the detention
itself as the Court apparently did in Davis. Alternatively, the
Court may have believed the availability of interrogation cre-
ates too great an opportunity to abuse the authority to detain.
It is also possible that interrogation itself, even within the lim-
its of Miranda, increases the intrusiveness of the detention suf-
ficiently to render it unreasonable in the absence of evidence
amounting to probable cause. Dunaway does not dispel the
ambiguity underlying the Davis rationale, although it may es-
tablish that during some detentions an interrogation or inten-
tion to engage in interrogation will render the detention
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
A related issue is the extent to which, and the circum-
stances under which, interrogation is permissible during an
otherwise valid field stop and the extent to which the subject's
refusal to respond can be considered in determining whether
probable cause exists for a subsequent arrest. Because of the
practical impossibility of providing counsel at this stage, the
Miranda right to the presence of counsel during interrogation
cannot apply. On the other hand, the person stopped has a fifth
amendment right to decline to give incriminating responses
even to general inquiries. 56 Perhaps this right requires that a
warning of the right to remain silent be given in the field stop
context.157 The Court has held that silence following the Mi-
randa warnings cannot be used against the subject at trial, and
155. The Court has not addressed, however, the equal protection concern
that some defendants are subjected to interrogations during custody and a con-
comitant increased risk of conviction because of financial inability to secure
pretrial release.
156. Cf. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3 (1979) (not necessary to decide
whether suspect who had been properly stopped could be criminally prose-
cuted for refusing to identify himself); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1981) (defendant undergoing custodial court-ordered psychiatric examination
before trial had right to remain silent).
157. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(5) (Official
Draft 1975) (warning of right to remain silent required and subject must be told
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an explicit invocation of the right to remain silent after Mi-
randa warnings cannot be used procedurally to the suspect's
detriment in other ways. What remains unclear is whether a
suspect's refusal, perhaps on fifth amendment grounds, to co-
operate in dispelling an officer's reasonable suspicion can have
any effect in determining whether the officer has probable
cause for an arrest and continued detention. In Brown v.
Texas, 5 8 the Court avoided a closely related issue by holding
the initial stop invalid because it was not even based on rea-
sonable suspicion. Consequently, the Court did not address
whether a suspect properly subjected to a field stop could be
criminally punished for refusing to provide his identity and
residence. 5 9
Martinez-Fuerte leaves similar questions unanswered in
the context of fixed checkpoint stops. In that case, during its
description of the fixed checkpoint stop, the Court quoted lan-
guage from United States v. Brignoni-Ponce160 to the effect that
such stops require only the subject's response to a brief ques-
tion or two "and possibly the production of a document evi-
dencing a right to be in the United States." This language, and
its subsequent approval in Martinez-Fuerte, leaves numerous
questions unresolved. Does the statement that responses can
be "required" mean officers may insist on responses even if
they would be self-incriminating, or that a refusal to respond
may establish probable cause to believe the subject is an illegal
alien? Is there any requirement that the subject of such ques-
tions be informed of the right, if it exists, not to answer, and of
the significance, if any, the officer can give to the suspect's re-
fusal to answer? Even more tantalizing is the Court's offhand
comment that documentation supporting the person's right to
be in the United States may "possibly" be required. When may
such documentation be required as a condition to release from
a fixed checkpoint stop? May an officer consider a subject's re-
fusal to respond to a request or demand for documentation in
determining the existence of probable cause? If the subject de-
clines to provide any documentation, may the officers conduct a
search for documentation or other evidence bearing upon the
person's status in the country? Moreover, what is the effect of
impermissible questioning, searching, or otherwise dealing
that if he or she desires presence of counsel he or she may be taken to sta-
tionhouse and will not be questioned until a lawyer is provided).
158. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
159. Id. at 53 n.3.
160. 422 U.S. 873 (1975), quoted in 428 U.S. at 558.
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with the subject, upon the validity of the detention itself? The
Court's "border search" case law addresses none of these
questions.
4. Conclusion
The Supreme Court cases dealing with detentions of the
person contain suggestions that considerations other than the
existence of adequate evidence to justify a detention may affect
the validity of the detention. Justice Stewart has suggested
that in some situations a "custodial" arrest may be insuffi-
ciently supported by state interests to be "reasonable." The
Court's 'prompt presentation" case law, however, is totally ob-
livious to the possibility that the duration of detention under a
valid arrest and the presentation before a magistrate to inquire
into the need for prolonged detention may have fourth amend-
ment implications. Dunaway appears to confirm that a deten-
tion for investigation upon reasonable suspicion can be
invalidated by the officer's subsequent conduct. What subse-
quent conduct renders the detention unreasonable and
whether an intention to use the detention for such an "unrea-
sonable" purpose renders it invalid from its inception is far
from clear. Fourth amendment cases provide virtually no
assistance in determining the permissible duration of the vari-
ous types of detention and the investigatory procedures and in-
cidental movement of the subject that officers can carry out
during these detentions. In addition, the cases virtually ignore
perhaps the most pervasive question in this area: the limits, if
any, the fourth amendment places upon the force that may be
used to effect a detention. It is unclear, for example, whether
unnecessary force has any fourth amendment significance.
Moreover, it may be that in regard to some detentions, even
necessary force may become unacceptable, as the use of deadly
force to effect a field stop on reasonable suspicion. Despite
nearly seventy years of experience in administering the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, these matters remain virtually
unexplored.
D. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
A fourth area to which the Court extends its ambivalence
concerning the reaches of the fourth amendment consists of
cases involving electronic surveillance. As in some of the other
areas, the electronic surveillance context requires the Court to
consider both statutory construction and constitutional limita-
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tions. In contrast to its approach in the other areas, however,
the Court at least has addressed the need to define which pro-
cedural defects, although of a statutory nature, will invoke the
extraordinary exclusionary sanction in electronic surveillance
cases. The most distinguishing feature of these decisions is the
difference between the Court's early expansive view of the
fourth amendment requirements regarding electronic surveil-
lance and the Court's subsequent reticence in applying the con-
gressional effort to implement and perhaps expand upon those
requirements.
1. Berger v. New York: The Expansive View
One term before it applied the fourth amendment to a wide
variety of electronic surveillance techniques in Katz v. United
States,161 the Supreme Court issued an opinion which reflects
an extremely expansive view of fourth amendment coverage in
the area of electronic surveillance. At issue in Berger v. New
York162 was the admissibility of evidence obtained by New
York police using a "bugging device" installed in an office pur-
suant to a court order issued under a New York statute. 63
Rather than examine the constitutional acceptability of the par-
ticular order which produced the evidence at issue in the
case,164 a majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Clark,
chose to consider the fourth amendment validity of the New
York statute "on its face."' 65 The majority apparently foresaw
the increasing role the amendment was to play in this area and
used the occasion to offer guidance concerning the type of stat-
utory provision for electronic surveillance that would survive
constitutional scrutiny. In the majority's view, electronic sur-
veillance poses unusually severe threats to the values pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. Thus, as a condition of
recognizing the validity of some surveillance, the Court under-
161. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
162. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
163. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (Consol. Supp. 1940-59).
164. The dissenters rigorously contested the propriety of the majority's ap-
proach. See 388 U.S. at 90 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (no reason to abandon rule
that litigant generally may not challenge statute on its face); id. at 111 (White,
J., dissenting) (question before Court is "whether this search complied with
Fourth Amendment standards" (emphasis in original)); id. at 82-83 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (instead of looking for "technical defects in the language of the
New York statute," Court should examine whether application of statute vio-
lated petitioner's rights in this case).
165. The Court explained only that Berger was "indisputably affected" by




took to define some constitutional limitations upon electronic
surveillance not applicable to other investigatory techniques.
The catalogue of defects the majority identified in the New
York statute also contains a list of requirements for future en-
actments. Some of the defects were relatively unremarkable
applications of the traditional evidentiary and warrant require-
ments of the fourth amendment. For example, the statute al-
lowed a judicial officer to issue an order upon an apparently
conclusory sworn allegation that reasonable grounds exist to
believe that the order will permit the police to obtain evidence
of crime, which prompted Justice Clark to remark that authori-
zation on these grounds "raises a serious probable-cause ques-
tion under the Fourth Amendment."166 Moreover, the majority
concluded that the statute was defective for failure to require
an adequately precise description of the thing to be seized. Al-
though the statute required the surveillance order to identify
conversations by reference to participants, the law did not re-
quire the order to specify the offense to which the conversa-
tions must be related or other characteristics of those
conversations that might distinguish them from conversations
irrelevant to the postulated crime.167 Similarly, the statute did
not require the order to describe the "place" to be searched,168
nor did it direct that police terminate eavesdropping once they
overheard incriminating conversations. Consequently, there
was no assurance in the statute that the "search" would be lim-
ited to that authorized by the issuing judicial officer.169 Further-
more, the statute failed to require prompt execution of the
warrant,I7 0 which left open the possibility that the intrusion
would be delayed so long that probable cause would cease to
exist. Finally, the statutory authorization of a two month pe-
riod of eavesdropping and allowance for easy extensions of the
original order'17 also increased the danger of surveillance at a
time so removed from the showing of probable cause that no
adequate evidentiary basis would exist for the intrusions.
The other defects the majority identified assume that the
reasonableness of eavesdropping under the fourth amendment
requires more than that the surveillance be based upon a disin-
terested judicial officer's evaluation of adequate evidence
166. Id. at 54-55.
167. Id. at 58-59.
168. Id. at 56.
169. Id. at 59-60.




before the fact. Noting that the surreptitious nature of eaves-
dropping precludes a requirement of notice "as [is required
for] conventional warrants," Justice Clark emphasized that the
New York statute did not overcome this "defect" by requiring
any showing of "exigent circumstances" or other "special
facts."'7 2 In addition, he observed that the state procedure
failed to require a return on the eavesdropping order, "thereby
leaving full discretion in the officer as to the use of seized con-
versations of innocent as well as guilty parties."173 The stat-
ute's grant of permission to eavesdrop, the majority concluded,
was "without adequate judicial supervision or protective proce-
dures" and therefore invalid under the fourth amendment.174
The precise contents of the latter two fourth amendment
requirements identified by Justice Clark are not entirely clear.
Absence of notice that eavesdropping will occur seems to be in-
herent in the technique. To require justification for the omis-
sion of notice in each particular case would be meaningless.
Perhaps Justice Clark was arguing that if a state dispenses
with advance notice in an unusually sensitive area such as
eavesdropping, the state must implement some reasonable sub-
stitute designed to achieve as nearly as possible, the same ob-
jective advance notice serves in the standard search situation.
The emphasis on the return requirement in Berger is some-
what anomalous when compared to the Court's facile rejection
of an analogous argument in Cady v. Dombrowski.175 Justice
Clark's rationale for stressing the need for a return appears to
be that the intrusiveness of eavesdropping varies with the use
authorities may subsequently make of seized conversations.
Thus an intrusion remains reasonable in fourth amendment
terms only if states make reasonable efforts to maintain judicial
control over the results of the intrusion. For present purposes
it is important to note that the majority's analysis assumed that
fourth amendment reasonableness in the electronic surveil-
lance context goes beyond a requirement of adequate evidence
to support the intrusion and advance judicial evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence. The Court assumed that, as a gen-
eral rule, some sort of advance notice of unusually intrusive
"searches" is constitutionally necessary and that the searching
officer's disposition of the "items" seized is constitutionally re-
quired to be regulated by a return procedure.
172. Id. at 60.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 60, 64.
175. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
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2. The Federal Statute
The Berger opinion undoubtedly served as the framework
for the comprehensive legislation governing state and federal
electronic surveillance of spoken words, which Congress en-
acted as Title DI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.176 This statute is one of the few legislative
efforts to identify and safeguard interests related to the fourth
amendment beyond what current case law suggests the Consti-
tution requires.
Subject to certain exceptions, the statute permits intercep-
tion of private spoken words only after a court has issued an
order in conformity with the detailed requirements of the stat-
ute. 7 7 The statute specifies grounds for an application for and
issuance of an order, and the contents of the order itself.I7 8
The order must contain "a particular description of the type of
communications" officials intend to intercept,17 9 and must di-
rect that it be executed as soon as practicable. 80 In addition,
the order must state that the officers are to conduct the inter-
ception in such a way as to minimize the interception of com-
munications not covered by the order,181 and that the
surveillance will terminate upon interception of the described
communications or in thirty days. 8 2
The statute provides for a return on the order to the issu-
ing court and for disposition of recordings of intercepted con-
versation as the judge directs. 8 3 The law imposes two
independent notice requirements. Officers must give notice to
persons named in the order or the application and to "such
other parties to intercepted communications as the judge may
determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice"
within 90 days of the termination of the interception. The no-
tice must include the date and period of entry, as well as a
statement of whether communications were intercepted. 84 In
addition, if authorities will use the intercepted communications
or evidence derived from them, all parties to the proceeding are
entitled to notice of the manner in which the communications
176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
177. Id. § 2511.
178. Id. § 2518(1) (application), § 2518(3) (issuance).
179. Id. § 2518(1)(b)(iii).
180. Id. § 2518(5).
181. Id.
182. Id.




were intercepted ten days before the proceeding.185
The statute contains its own exclusionary rule. Prosecut-
ing authorities may not use intercepted communications or evi-
dence derived from them in any federal, state or local
proceeding if the interception violated the statute.186 A court
must enter an order suppressing communications intercepted
or derivative evidence if it finds that "the communication was
unlawfully intercepted," the order was "insufficient on its face,"
or the interception was not made in conformity with the
order.18 7
In contrast to its expansive view of the fourth amendment
at the time of Berger, the Court has implemented the federal
statute and apparently views the underlying fourth amendment
considerations very restrictively. The eases reflect a
great reluctance to read the statute and its constitutional basis
as imposing rigorous limitations upon the manner in which offi-
cials must carry out an otherwise valid interception under the
statute.
3. Implementation of the Federal Statute
The Court has demonstrated reluctance to develop three
aspects of the 1968 electronic surveillance statute which deal
with implementation of an otherwise valid intercept order: the
post-interception notice requirement, the provision for entry to
install intercept equipment, and the mandatory directive to the
officers to minimize interception of nondescribed communica-
tions. The Court's approach in this area, however, must be as-
sessed in light of its treatment of the statutory exclusionary
rule.
The statute contains a myriad of procedural requirements
for interception of protected communications and an unquali-
fied directive that judges suppress the products of any "unlaw-
ful" interception. 188 In United States v. Giordano 8 9 and United
States v. Chavez,190 however, the Court rejected the argument
that deviation from any of the statutory requirements renders
an interception "unlawful" within the meaning of the exclu-
sionary sanction. Under Giordano and Chavez, only violations
of statutory provisions that "directly and substantially imple-
185. Id. § 2518(9).
186. Id. § 2518(10) (a).
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
189. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
190. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
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ment the congressional intent to limit the use of intercept pro-
cedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment
.of this extraordinary investigative device" require exclusion.191
To some extent, after Giordano and Chavez, the Court was
faced with a task analogous to the task tht would have been
presented if it had held, in traditional search and arrest situa-
tions, that the fourth amendment addresses the means by
which an otherwise valid search or seizure is implemented.
Giordano and Chavez require the court to identify which statu-
tory requirements are directly and sufficiently related to the
underlying purpose of the federal statute before implementing
the exclusionary sanction. A similarly broad reading of the
fourth amendment, in the context of traditional limits upon im-
plementation of searches and seizures, would require the
Supreme Court to identify those limits that are sufficiently re-
lated to the underlying purpose of the fourth amendment to
justify incorporating them into the amendment's requirement
of reasonableness. The Court's performance of its self-assigned
task under Giordano and Chavez may thus be instructive as to
the desirability or practicality of a broadened interpretation of
fourth amendment reasonableness.
a. Notice
The Supreme Court's treatment of the statute's post-inter-
ception notice requirement in two recent cases suggests that
the Court's view of the importance of notice has changed signif-
icantly. The post-interception notice provisions were most
likely designed to provide a substitute for the pre-interception
notice stressed in Berger.192 To some extent, the notice provi-
sions are likely to have constitutional significance, at least if
Berger accurately reflects the fourth amendment requirements
in this area.
In United States v. Kahn,193 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the federal statute requires authorities to identify all
known persons whose conversations will be intercepted in the
application and interception order, even if there is no reason to
believe that these persons are involved in the offense under in-
vestigation. The majority relied heavily upon the explicit lan-
guage of the statute to support its ruling.194 The Court noted
191. 416 U.S. at 527.
192. See supra text accompanying note 172.
193. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
194. Id. at 151-53.
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that the statutory provisions for information in the applica-
tion'9 5 do not mandate identification of nonsuspects whose con-
versations are likely to be overheard, and reasoned that it
would be unreasonable to require the order to identify such
persons because the judge could learn of their existence only
through the application.19 6 This analysis, of course, ignores the
possibility that the statute might impose only minimal require-
ments for an application and that the government, when it
seeks an interception order that will invade the privacy of non-
suspects, must include more in the application than these mini-
mal requirements demand. The majority responded to the
lower court's concern that without such identification the inter-
cept order would be equivalent to a "general warrant," by not-
ing that the order identified the conversations to be intercepted
by subject matter 97 and that even a regular search warrant
need not identify persons with privacy interests in the items to
be seized or the premises to be searched.198 Clearly, the Court
gave little significance to the implication of Berger that warrant
requirements should be applied rigorously when electronic sur-
veillance is involved. The majority also relied upon the statu-
tory requirement that the order be executed so as to minimize
the interception of undescribed conversations to reduce the
"general warrant" flavor of the order under review.
In United States v. Donovan,199 however, the Court held
that a surveillance application must identify those persons au-
thorities have probable cause to believe are involved in the tar-
get offense and whose conversations will be intercepted if the
application is granted. The Court then addressed the need to
exclude evidence under the statutory exclusionary rule if an
application fails to identify such an individual. The meager leg-
islative history indicated to the Court that Congress intended
the application identification requirement to satisfy what the
legislators perceived to be a constitutional demand of particu-
larization.2 00 Moreover, the Court concluded that compliance
with the identification requirement would not have affected the
judicial authorization of the intercept because the statutorily
imposed preconditions for issuance were satisfied. Conse-
195. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
196. 415 U.S. at 152.
197. Id. at 154.
198. Id. at 155 n.15.
199. 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
200. Id. at 437.
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quently, under Giordano and Chavez, exclusion was not
required.
A second issue before the Court directly involved the post-
interception notice requirement. The Court concluded that
while the government need not necessarily provide the court
with precise identification of each party to each intercepted
conversation, it must provide a description of the general class
or classes they comprise. Identification of only those persons
as to whom there is reasonable possibility of indictment will
not suffice,201 and if the government seeks to supply the judge
with a list of all identifiable persons whose conversations were
overheard, the list must be complete.202 The Court stressed
that this information was necessary to decide whether to give
such persons post-intercept notice and to determine the possi-
ble constitutional nature of such notice.203 The Court cau-
tioned, however, that if the government fails to perform its duty
and the persons are therefore denied post-intercept discretion-
ary notice, it does not necessarily follow that the conversations
were "unlawfully intercepted" within the meaning of the statu-
tory exclusionary rule. To reach this result, the Court relied on
the primary significance of the issuance and service of the or-
der, and pointed out that denial of inventory notices does not
cast doubt upon the existence of a validly issued and served or-
der.204 The Court found the only indication in the legislative
history of the congressional rationale for the notice require-
ment was to "assure the community that the wiretap technique
is reasonably employed."205 Other functions notice might per-
form received no consideration. Although the Court observed
in a footnote that the litigants in Donovan were not prejudiced
by denial of notice because the government provided them with
the intercept order, application and relevant papers,20 6 the
opinion did not indicate that this absence of prejudice was es-
sential to the holding permitting use of the evidence.
b. Entry
Berger did not explicitly address the possibility of restric-
tions on the manner in which authorities implement an other-
wise valid surveillance, or the degree of judicial supervision the
201. Id. at 431.
202. Id. at 432.
203. Id. at 429-30.
204. Id. at 438.
205. Id. at 439.
206. Id. at 439 n.26.
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Constitution might require. The spirit of the decision, however,
strongly suggests that these are issues not wholly removed
from constitutional scrutiny. Although interception of conver-
sations conducted in premises intrudes significantly on an indi-
vidual's privacy, a law enforcement officer's secret physical
entry into those premises arguably presents an additional and
even more significant intrusion upon the occupants' privacy in-
terests. In Dalia v. United States,207 however, the Court nearly,
if not entirely, removed this consideration from constitutional
scrutiny. Dalia involved covert entry on business premises
and installation of a device to accomplish court-authorized in-
terception of conversations in those premises. After rejecting
Dalia's argument that either the fourth amendment or the fed-
eral statute entirely bars such covert entries, the majority
turned to his claim that the Constitution permits such entries
only if they are specifically authorized by the issuing judge,
presumably upon a showing that this exceptionally intrusive
manner of implementation is necessary. Justice Powell, speak-
ing for the Court, emphasized that the order as issued complied
with the traditional requirements imposed by the fourth
amendment: a neutral issuing authority, a showing of "probable
cause," and a reasonably particular description of the things to
be seized.208 Nothing in the Constitution's language or in the
Court's decisions, he maintained, suggests that a warrant must
address the "precise" manner of service, a matter generally left
to the discretion of the executing officer.2 09 Without elaborat-
ing, Powell observed that the Court had held, and the govern-
ment had conceded, that "the manner in which a warrant is
executed" is subject to later judicial review as to its reasona-
bleness. 2 10 The Court did not address whether this subsequent
207. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
208. Id. at 255-56.
209. Id. at 257.
210. Id. at 258. In support of this statement, Justice Powell cited a single
passage in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978). In Zurcher, the
Court rejected the argument that the fourth amendment prohibits issuance of a
warrant to search premises for evidence when the premises are those of a third
party not suspected of involvement in the offense, even though those premises
at issue in Zurcher were the arguably sensitive premises of a newspaper. The
language to which the Court referred in Dalia apparently is the following:
This is not to question that "reasonableness" is the overriding test
of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to assert that searches,
however or whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if sup-
ported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying
the place to be searched and the property to be seized.
436 U.S. at 559-60. Contrary to Justice Powell's description, this clearly does not
constitute a "holding" that the manner in which a search warrant is executed is
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judicial review applies to such characteristics of the service as
the decision to employ means that require covert entry.
c. Minimization
Berger did not address the need for officers executing an
otherwise valid surveillance order to minimize their overhear-
ing or "interception" of conversations that do not come within
the category of conversations which the order permits to be in-
tercepted. Given the Court's emphasis on the precise nature of
the descriptions of the communications sought, however, there
can be little doubt that the Court assumed that minimum inter-
ception of immaterial conversations would be necessary. Con-
gress explicitly recognized the need to minimize interception of
immaterial conversations, and required that each intercept or-
der contain a directive to the executing officers to conduct the
intercept- in such a way as to minimize the interception of com-
munications other than those described.211
The minimization provision came before the Supreme
Court in Scott v. United States.2 1 2 The majority first rejected
Scott's claim that the executing officers violated the minimiza-
tion requirement by making no effort to comply with it. The
Court apparently believed the relevant question to be whether,
if the officers had attempted to comply, their actual failure to
avoid intercepting any communications to which they had ac-
cess would have been a violation of the requirement. 2 13 In ana-
lyzing this question, the majority emphasized that the
executing officers had reason to believe that the scheme under
investigation was extensive, that many participants were in-
volved, that the interception was fairly short in duration so the
officers had little opportunity to develop a basis for excluding
certain categories of calls, and that many of the calls were short
and ambiguous, making it difficult or impossible to determine
the calls' relevance to the investigation.2 14 To support their re-
subject to review for its reasonableness. The issue in the case was the general
proposition that searches of third party press premises for evidence are inher-
ently unreasonable. Although the Court commented that "[no]thing else
presented here persuaded us that the [Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments
forbade this search," id. at 568, it does not appear that the plaintiffs challenged
the manner in which authorities executed the warrant. This issue was not ad-
dressed by the district court or by the court of appeals. See Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
212. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
213. Id. at 137-39.
214. Id. at 140-42.
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jection of Scott's argument that the officers' bad faith invali-
dated the interception under the statute, the majority relied
heavily upon prior fourth amendment cases and found a con-
gressional intent not to press the scope of the suppression rule
beyond then-current constitutional law. 215 Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, which addressed the agents' compliance with the stat-
utory requirement, gave no indication that the issue had consti-
tutional overtones. Rehnquist's discussion proceeded as if the
issue were a purely statutory question.
4. Conclusion
The electronic surveillance cases, perhaps better than any
others, evidence the Court's fluctuations in dealing with man-
ner-of-search issues. Berger reflects an expansive reading of
fourth amendment reasonableness which imposes significant
demands upon the manner in which officers implement a val-
idly authorized search. The Berger Court placed special em-
phasis upon proper notice, which is apparently required after
the intrusion if practicality precludes preintrusion notice, and
upon judicial supervision of the disposition of the fruits of the
search, which is accomplished through the return and inven-
tory process. In contrast, the Court's treatment of these and re-
lated issues in construing and applying the statute apparently
designed to implement Berger reflects a much narrower
approach.
In Dalia, Justice Powell characterized Donovan as holding
that the post-interception notice provisions of the statute are a
constitutionally adequate substitute for pre-intrusion notice.2 1 6
However, Donovan's holding that the notice provisions are not
directly or sufficiently related to the congressional purpose to
bring the statutory exclusionary rule into play suggests a far
different view of the significance of the notice requirement.
This different view is confirmed by Kahn, in which the Court's
conclusion that neither the application nor the order needs to
identify persons whose conversations may be intercepted but
who are not suspects was reached without consideration of the
value of such identification in assuring post-interception notice.
Although Berger did not address the manner of entry to im-
plement an interception, it is reasonable to assume that this
was likely due to oversight or constraints of space and time.
The Berger majority would no doubt have regarded the deci-
215. Id. at 139.
216. Id. at 248.
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sion to implement an intercept order by covert entry into prem-
ises as a matter of fourth amendment dimensions. Yet Dalia
almost rejects this approach. Dalia clearly holds that the
fourth amendment demands no pre-intrusion evaluation of the
justification for covert entry. Although the decision leaves
open the possibility of post-intrusion review of whether the use
of covert entry to implement an interception was reasonable,
the Court's emphasis on officers' traditional discretion to make
decisions concerning the manner in which such orders are exe-
cuted suggests that the Court will not engage in rigorous re-
view of officers' discretionary decisions. Minimization of the
scope of surveillance seems even more directly related than no-
tice to the concerns underlying Berger. Scott, however, reflects
an unwillingness to rigorously apply the statutory minimization
requirement, a requirement that may be directly related to the
basic concerns the Court expressed in Berger. The Scott ma-
jority's failure to acknowledge any constitutional overtones to
the issue suggests that the manner in which a validly issued or-
der is served is not a major concern.
Finally, the electronic surveillance cases provide some ba-
sis to evaluate the Court's willingness and ability to administer
a rule that requires the Court to select those procedural re-
quirements which should trigger the exclusionary sanction.
Decisions applying the Giordano-Chavez standard, which pro-
vides that the requirements must be directly and substantially
related to the underlying purpose of limiting electronic surveil-
lance, provide few grounds for optimism. For example, regard-
less of whether the result of application of the standard to the
post-intercept notice requirements at issue in Donovan is ap-
propriate, the Court's failure to examine critically the possible
functions of notice and their relationship to congressional con-
cern is unfortunate. The same can be said of the Court's fail-
ure, in the same decision, to explore carefully the possible
functions of the statutory requirement that all suspects whose
conversations will be intercepted be identified in the applica-
tion and order. The Court's unwillingness to connect this re-
quirement with the notice matter, acknowledged in Dalia to be
of constitutional dimensions, is especially distressing, although
perhaps understandable in light of the Court's treatment of the
notice requirements when directly confronted with them. Al-
though Donovan is only a single decision, it warrants concern
regarding the Court's ability to identify which procedural re-
quirements are significantly related to fourth amendment prin-





Despite Sierra's lesson that many characteristics of a
search or seizure other than the adequacy of supporting evi-
dence and compliance with the warrant requirement may be
relevant to fourth amendment reasonableness, the Supreme
Court's treatment of these matters is amazingly unclear. Per-
haps the most significant example of the lack of guidelines in
this area is the absence of any definitive or even suggestive
pronouncements concerning the extent to which the degree of
force used to effect a search or seizure affects the reasonable-
ness of the law enforcement action. Despite the frequency with
which this issue arises, the Court has failed to address the mat-
ter.217 Even when the Court has discussed other related issues,
it has been unable to develop any consistent or coherent body
of principles.
Although some signals from the Court indicate that reason-
ableness may encompass aspects of a search or seizure other
than the evidentiary and warrant requirements, these signals
have almost all been dicta. Schmerber, Davis, and Ker fall into
this category. Berger was a curious advisory opinion, and al-
though the Court's discussion perhaps was not technically
dicta, it can scarcely be regarded as a definitive holding. On
the other hand, Dunaway did involve an invalidation of the po-
lice procedure at issue there. The Court neglected to specify
which aspects of the detention invalidated the procedure, how-
217. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), officers conducted a war-
rantless search of an automobile and discovered illicit liquor. The dissent
noted that the search involved tearing the cushion before the liquor was found,
id. at 172 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), a fact the majority opinion did not men-
tion. In United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1982), the Court cited Car-
roll as upholding a search of the scope involved. After concluding that a
warrantless search of an automobile may be as broad as a search authorized by
a search warrant, 102 S. Ct. at 2172, the Court observed, "Since ... a warrant
could have authorized the agent [in Carroll] to ... rip the upholstery in [his]
search for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally permissible."
Id., at 2169. For present purposes, this is significant because of the Court's fail-
ure to give any indication that the "force" used in the Carroll search, and the
resulting damage to the automobile, had any independent fourth amendment
significance. Given that a search of the cushion involved damage to property,
would it have been "reasonable" if the officers had not first searched other
parts of the car to exclude the possibility that the search could have been suc-
cessfully accomplished without increasing its intrusiveness by ripping the
cushion? The Ross discussion suggests that reasonableness imposes no re-
quirement that officers conducting an otherwise valid search minimize damage
to the subject's property during the search. On the other hand, the issue of
force was not before the Court in Ross. The Court might respond differently if
confronted directly with a search supported by probable cause but imple-
mented in a manner involving unnecessary destruction of property.
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ever. These cases suggest that the Court is willing to articulate,
if not to apply, an expansive view of fourth amendment reason-
ableness in relationship to those procedures that present spe-
cial dangers to underlying fourth amendment interests.218
Berger confronted the Court with the use of electronic surveil-
lance. Davis and Dunaway involved detentions on the basis of
less evidence than the traditional probable cause requirement
demands. Schmerber raised the fourth amendment issue in the
context of penetration beneath the subject's skin, an exception-
ally intrusive form of search. To some extent, the Court's dicta
suggesting an expansive construction of reasonableness ap-
pears to be a tradeoff against its willingness to stretch the
fourth amendment to permit exceptionally intrusive forms of
investigation, however. The Court is most willing to apply an
218. The same uncertainty is evident in the so-called "administrative
search" cases. In some situations, the Court has upheld intrusions upon pri-
vacy for quasi-criminal purposes pursuant to a warrant issued upon a diluted
"probable cause" standard, see, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
538-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967), or even without a
court order and without any evidentiary basis at all. See, e.g., Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981). The Court's discussions have suggested, but
not held, that this relaxation or abandonment of standard fourth amendment
limitations in this area must be counterbalanced by relatively stringent limita-
tions upon the execution of the searches authorized. Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), for example, held that Congress had not au-
thorized forcible entry to effectuate inspections of the premises of federally li-
censed dealers in alcoholic beverages. Id. at 77. The Court did not address
whether an inspection pursuant to legislatively-authorized forcible entry would
be "reasonable" in fourth amendment terms. In United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972), the Court upheld warrantless inspections of the commercial
premises of firearms dealers licensed under The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976). 406 U.S. at 317. The statute authorized entry for in-
spection "during business hours." 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976). Although the
Court stressed that neither the threat to privacy posed by the inspections nor
the danger of abuse were, in its view, "of impressive dimensions," 406 U.S. at
317, it is unclear whether the limitation upon the timing of the inspections was
essential to these conclusions. In Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981),
the Court held that warrantless inspections of mines under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. I1 1979), are reason-
able. In part, this conclusion rested upon the majority's satisfaction with the
"specific mechanism" provided in the statutory scheme to accommodate any
special privacy concerns a specific mine operator might have. 452 U.S. at 604.
Forcible entry to make an inspection is prohibited, and an inspector who is de-
nied entry must seek an injunction against future refusals in a proceeding
which permits the mine owner to obtain "an order accommodating any unusual
privacy interest" that might be involved. Id. at 605. The majority cited with ap-
parent approval a lower court decision, Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation
Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980), in which the
court ordered inspectors to keep the mine's trade secrets confidential. The im-
plication is that, at least in particular situations, the manner in which an other-
wise "reasonable" inspection is carried out might render it in conflict with the
demands of the fourth amendment.
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expansive reading of reasonableness when the technique at is-
sue appears to demand extraordinary regulation to assure its
overall reasonableness.
Other decisions signal the Court's hostility toward reading
the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness as ex-
tending beyond the evidence and warrant requirements. Again,
the signals are not particularly forceful, or they are arguably
ambiguous. Gooding's apparent rejection of constitutional lim-
its on the timing of a search may be attributable to the formula-
tion of the issues in the lower courts. Dalia clearly rejected the
proposition that reasonableness demands a pre-intrusion re-
view of the propriety of covert entry to install an electronic sur-
veillance device. The case leaves open the possibility of a
requirement of post-intrusion review, however. The McNabb-
Mallory line of cases does not attribute any constitutional sig-
nificance to prompt presentation, but it appears doubtful that
the Court has considered the arguments for using prompt pres-
entation as a means to limit the duration of an initially reason-
able arrest. Dombrowski rejects the argument that the return
and inventory aspects of the warrant process are of constitu-
tional dimensions. This result is in sharp contrast to the Berger
discussion of the return. The minimal significance the Court
attributed to post-interception notice in Kahn and Donovan
confirms that Dombrowski may rest upon a perception that the
fourth amendment protects no interest in minimizing the dura-
tion of a seizure.
Equally important is the Court's unwillingness to examine
critically the possible functions of limits on means of imple-
menting searches and seizures and the possible relationship of
these limits to fourth amendment values. Gooding and Dom-
browski, for example, reflect virtually no effort to examine the
significance of nighttime service and the warrant return and in-
ventory process. In situations in which the Court has ex-
amined the functions of, and values served by, the procedure,
its analysis has made no attempt to relate these values to
fourth amendment considerations. Thus, although Ker, Miller,
and Sabbath involved an examination of the purposes the an-
nouncement requirement serves, none of the cases explored
whether those purposes bear a significant relationship to fourth
amendment protected interests. Similarly, the prompt presen-
tation cases reflect a rather imprecise effort to examine the
value of prompt presentation in preventing abuse of custodial
interrogation. These decisions contain no inquiry into the po-
tential value of appearance before a magistrate in implement-
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ing a possible fourth amendment interest in having an initially
valid arrest result in custody only of the necessary duration to
effectuate the relevant state interest. Finally, the Court's im-
plementation of the Crime Control Act's selective exclusionary
rule confirms the Court's reluctance or inability to undertake
critical scrutiny of statutory requirements to determine the sig-
nificance of their relationship to an underlying and primary
purpose, even when the Court has previously acknowledged its
obligation to do so.
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Although the cases discussed in the preceding section con-
firm that a considerable number of characteristics of police ac-
tion might affect the fourth amendment "reasonableness" of a
search or seizure, the cases also suggest that certain aspects of
search and seizure activity are of particular importance: the
force used to effect a search or seizure, the time at which the
search or seizure takes place, and the duration of the search or
seizure. To the extent that these aspects of law enforcement
conduct raise fourth amendment considerations, it is necessary
to evaluate what procedural demands the reasonableness re-
quirement generates. A need to avoid unnecessary force when
entering premises to search, for example, may "constitutional-
ize" the requirement of prior announcement. Similarly, a need
to minimize the duration of seizures may "constitutionalize"
the requirement of a return on a search warrant or, in the case
of a seizure of the person, the requirement of prompt presenta-
tion. The initial, and for present purposes controlling, question,
however, is whether the use of force, the time at which the ac-
tion takes place and the duration of the intrusion have, or
should have, any independent fourth amendment significance.
The remainder of this Article attempts to answer this ques-
tion. First, the Article examines the historical background of
the fourth amendment. Next, there is a discussion of whether
the force used in, or the timing or duration of, a search or
seizure significantly affects the privacy interests the fourth
amendment protects. Finally, the Article examines whether
there are persuasive reasons why the Court should construe
fourth amendment reasonableness in a way which avoids ad-





Historical inquiry has limited value in establishing the con-
tent of the fourth amendment. As Professor Amsterdam has
observed, although one can identify the practices which stimu-
lated the development of the fourth amendment219 with some
accuracy, and although it seems clear that courts must con-
strue the amendment so as to address those practices, histori-
cal analysis is of little assistance when considering the extent
to which the amendment should govern other practices. Am-
sterdam makes a persuasive case for the proposition that the
amendment's content should not be limited to those matters
which stimulated its development.220 Moreover, the terms of
the amendment appear to support this view. The second clause
of the amendment, which contains the requirements of prob-
able cause and specificity for warrants, would have been suffi-
cient by itself to deal with the major concern of the framers,
which was colonial officials' abuse of general warrants. There-
fore, the inclusion of the first clause and its broad requirement
of "reasonableness" indicates that the framers intended to gen-
eralize beyond the practices that immediately concerned them.
At the time of the formulation and adoption of the amend-
ment, nonpolitical and general investigatorial law enforcement
techniques had not become the subject of either public concern
or litigation.221 Consequently, the historical background of the
amendment offers little help in addressing whether and how
the amendment should restrict such techniques today. None-
theless, historical inquiry may have some value. If the concern
that gave rise to the fourth amendment was limited to the
existence of an adequate evidentiary basis for searches and the
issuance of a warrant upon probable cause and adequate speci-
ficity, history suggests, although by no means conclusively, that
the current content of the amendment might be limited to
these requirements. Insofar as the historical concerns included
other matters, however, a more persuasive case is made for the
proposition that courts should construe the amendment's gen-
eral reasonableness clause to address these concerns and
others like them.
As Professor Taylor has pointed out, the original under-
standing of the fourth amendment must refer to the objections
219. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MMN. L. REV.
349, 398 (1974).
220. Id. at 399.
221. Id. at 398.
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raised to general warrants and writs of assistance.222 Among
the most fruitful sources from which to identify these objec-
tions are Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington,2 23
Mansfield's opinion in Money v. Dryden Leach,224 and other as-
pects of the litigation arising from the investigation of The
North Briton No. 45.
Both Entick and Money were civil damage actions based
upon searches and detention under the authority of general
warrants issued by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, in con-
nection with investigations of seditious libel. Although the ap-
peals were decided on somewhat narrow grounds, the cases
were widely regarded as an attack upon oppressive general
warrants and reflect the concerns that can be said to have stim-
ulated the fourth amendment.
Leach and related litigation arose out of a warrant author-
izing the search for and apprehension of the unidentified au-
thor of The North Briton No. 45. Authorities arrested a number
of printers, one of whom turned out to be the actual printer of
the described publication. The printer led the executing offi-
cials to the author, John Wilkes, a member of Parliament. Offi-
cials detained Wilkes and searched his residence. A test case
on behalf of the printers resulted in an award of damages, 225
and a suit brought by Leach, another printer, also resulted in a
verdict against the defendants. This judgment was affirmed by
the King's Bench on the narrow ground that because the plain-
tiff was not in fact the printer of the described publication the
warrant was no defense to his detention.226 Wilkes himself suc-
cessfully sued the undersecretary who supervised the execu-
tion of the warrant against him.22 7
The reports of the decisions make clear that a major objec-
tion to the warrant was its general nature. This characteristic
of the searches was not the judiciary's only concern, however.
In Wilkes's litigation, for example, Chief Justice Pratt ad-
dressed the jury and attacked the legality of the warrant. In his
list of the warrant's deficiencies, he identified the failure to
specify the offenders by name and the absence of an inventory
of the items carried away.2 28 In Leach's case, the court clearly
222. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDiEs IN CONSTrrTUIONAL INTERPRETATION 38 (1969).
223. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
224. 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765).
225. Id.
226. Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765).
227. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
228. Id. at 498.
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emphasized evidence that the search of Leach's premises re-
quired six hours and that officials held Leach in custody four
days before presenting him before Lord Halifax, who deter-
mined Leach not to be the printer of the described libel and re-
leased him. Although the jury apparently determined that the
four-day detention was unreasonable, the length of the deten-
tion was ultimately irrelevant because the warrant could not be
used to justify Leach's detention at all.
Entick involved another warrant issued by Lord Halifax
concerning a suspected seditious libel, although this warrant
named the plaintiff as the person to be seized and to be
brought, "together with his books and papers," before the Sec-
retary for examination. The search of the plaintiffs residence,
during which officials seized the plaintiff and various papers,
required four hours. The plaintiff subsequently brought a tres-
pass action against those who had executed the warrant. After
a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the case was argued to the
Court of Common Pleas en banc. Lord Camden spoke for the
court, which awarded judgment for the plaintiffs. The court
found the warrant insufficient to prevent liability because the
defendants had not strictly followed its terms. They had not
taken a constable with them as the warrant directed. More-
over, after seizing the plaintiff and his papers, the officials
brought him before Lord Halifax's assistant, rather than before
Lord Halifax himself as required by the warrant.22 9
Lord Camden's opinion also discussed other aspects of the
warrant not actually before the court. For example, Lord Cam-
den observed that the warrant was too general, because it au-
thorized the seizure of all of the suspect's papers, regardless of
whether they were libelous or had any relationship to the li-
bel.230 Moreover, the warrant was not predicated upon a show-
ing that the person had "criminal papers" in his possession.231
In addition, Lord Camden clearly was concerned with the ab-
sence of any safeguards to regulate the post-seizure custody of
the papers seized. Noting the absence of any requirement that
the executing official "take an exact inventory [of the papers
seized], and deliver a copy,"232 he concluded that the Secretary
did not have the power to issue the warrants.233 The warrant
did not grant the owner any right to reclaim the items seized,
229. 95 Eng. Rep. at 809.
230. Id. at 1065.
231. Id. at 1067.
232. Id.
233. If the power to issue such warrants existed, he reasoned, safeguards of
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even if he established his innocence at trial.23 4 In contrast, dur-
ing the search for and seizure of stolen goods, the validity of
which Lord Camden doubted, the seized goods were placed in
the hands of a public officer until the owner's right to them
ripened.235
The value of this historical examination is questionable.
The cases arose in the context of political controversy, and
there is no indication that any of the views expressed in them
were intended to address important concerns of day to day
nonpolitical law enforcement. The underlying issues concerned
civil liability, not admissibility of evidence. Consequently, the
political rhetoric in the cases was not subject to the possible
mitigating influence of consideration of proposed rules' poten-
tial impact on the admissibility of reliable evidence in prosecu-
tions for serious "nonpolitical" criminal offenses.
The English seditious libel cases clearly demonstrate, how-
ever, that concerns over the general warrants at issue were not
limited to the existence of probable cause, judicial evaluation
of probable cause before the search, and a valid warrant
describing the items to be seized with reasonable precision.
Both Entick and Wilkes expressed concern over the absence of
an inventory requirement and a return of the seized items.
Leach emphasized the officials' failure to comply with the ex-
isting requirement of "prompt presentation" before the issuing
executive officer. Moreover, the emphasis on the six-hour dura-
tion of the search in Leach suggests concern that officers
should execute a warrant in a manner which at least avoids
searches of extraordinary duration.
B. RELATIONSHIP TO UNDERLYING FouRTH AMENDMENT
PRIVACY INTERESTS
Perhaps more fruitful than historical analysis is an exami-
nation of the extent to which the major characteristics of
"searches" and "seizures" at issue in this Article-the amount
of force used, timing, and duration-appear to infringe on inter-
ests the fourth amendment should protect. To the extent that
these characteristics implicate fourth amendment interests,
they appear to be within the purview of the amendment's "rea-
sonableness" requirement.
this nature would have developed. The absence of the safeguards therefore
suggested that there was no power to issue the warrants. Id.




A threshold problem with the usefulness of this approach,
however, is the absence of a comprehensive and workable defi-
nition of basic fourth amendment interests. In Katz v. United
States,23 6 widely regarded as the seminal case concerning
fourth amendment coverage, the Court rejected the notion that
the fourth amendment embodies a "general constitutional
'right to privacy."' 237 The Court's opinion, authored by Justice
Stewart, offers primarily a negative definition of fourth amend-
ment coverage. "What a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
lic, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."238 On the other hand, what a person
"seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally pro-
tected."23 9 Undoubtedly because of the unsatisfactory nature
of Justice Stewart's discussion in Katz, cases citing Katz as
precedent frequently cite Justice Harlan's "understanding" of
the criteria applied by the majority. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan concluded that fourth amendment coverage is
invoked if a person has "exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy," apparently in the form of an assumption
that an intrusion of the sort at issue will not occur, and that
"the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' ",240 Although Justice Harlan's formulation uses
236. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
237. Id. at 350.
238. Id. at 351.
239. Id. at 351-52.
240. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). One scholar recently considered the
scope of fourth amendment coverage under Katz and subsequent decisions
and summarized:
[The] right [to be secure in... persons, houses, papers, and effects]
appears to include both (1) property interests of the sort traditionally
protected by tort actions for conversion and for trespass to real and
personal property; and (2) interests in bodily integrity, mental tran-
quility, and freedom of movement traditionally protected by tort ac-
tions for assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and, more
recently, for intentional, reckless, or negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress and for invasion of that branch of the right of privacy which pro-
tects people against physically intrusive surveillance.
Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 50-51.
The relationship between the Katz privacy standard and the fourth amend-
ment protection against "seizures" is less clear. The basic conceptual problem
is whether seizures are merely one manner of intruding upon the privacy pro-
tected by the amendment and defined by Katz. If not, seizure must be sepa-
rately defined. The case law is unclear. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 351 (1977), the Court commented that the seizure of an automobile,
without more, "did not involve any invasion of privacy." This statement sug-
gests that protection against seizures is not a part of privacy protection. But
see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n. 8 (1977), where the Court re-
ferred to a seizure of a footlocker as "surely a substantial infringement of re-
spondents' use and possession" and within fourth amendment protection. The
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the word "priviacy" as if it were self-defined, the subsequent
cases demonstrate that this was hardly an appropriate
assumption.241
The major uncertainties as to the "privacy" interests which
the fourth amendment protects, however, are not significant
here in the way they are ordinarily- considered. The present
discussion concerns matters that clearly constitute "searches"
or "seizures" within the meaning of the fourth amendment and
consequently invoke the amendment's coverage. The question
presented in this Article is a more subtle one: Do various char-
acteristics of the manner in which the search or seizure is car-
ried out have some independent fourth amendment
significance? The answer to this question may well turn upon
the answer to a further question: Does a search or seizure con-
ducted in a certain manner, as with unnecessary and thus ex-
cessive physical force, intrude more significantly upon fourth
amendment interests than one conducted without excessive
force? If the answer is in the affirmative, that aspect of the
manner in which the search or seizure is conducted can be said
to have independent fourth amendment significance and to in-
voke the coverage of the amendment's requirement of
reasonableness.
Unfortunately, posing the problem in this manner does not
Court's further comment that respondents' "principal privacy interest" was in
the contents of the locker rather than in "the container itself," id. (emphasis
supplied), suggests that the interest in use and possession of items, upon
which a seizure infringes, is an aspect of the right of privacy discussed and de-
fined in Katz. In other words, while Katz used search terminology, the concept
of privacy used in the discussion appears to serve as the conceptual basis for
defining all activity covered by the fourth amendment, whether "searches" or
"seizures" within the terminology of the amendment. But see United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), where the Court discussed whether a brief
warrantless detention of a mailed package violated the fourth amendment.
While some of the discussion suggests the Court perceived one of the issues
before it to be whether the detention constituted a "search" within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, id. at 252, the Court did not mention Katz and its
privacy standard. Ultimately, the Court appears to have merged the questions
whether a seizure took place and whether any seizure that occurred was rea-
sonable. Id. at 253. The result in Van Leeuwen probably stems from a conclu-
sion that any intrusion on fourth amendment protected interests was so
minimal as not to bring the condemnation of the amendment into play. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 242-45.
241. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (use of a "pen
register," which records numbers dialed from a phone but not contents of the
conversations, does not constitute a "search"); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976) (obtaining access to suspect's bank records by subpoena is not a
"search"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (overhearing conver-
sation between suspect and informant who was surreptitiously carrying radio
transmitter is not "search").
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make it easier to answer. This conclusion will become obvious
from an examination of the three characteristics of law enforce-
ment conduct and the apparent underlying privacy interests
involved.
A preliminary caveat is required, however. Recent
Supreme Court cases strongly suggest that a characteristic of
law enforcement conduct must not only infringe upon pro-
tected fourth amendment privacy, but it must do so signifi-
cantly, to implicate the fourth amendment. In United States v.
Van Leeuwen,242 officials delayed mailed packages that
aroused suspicion until they obtained a basis to apply for a
search warrant authorizing their inspection. Acknowledging
that, at least in theory, "detention" of mail could become an un-
reasonable seizure, the Court nevertheless held that detaining
these packages for twenty-nine hours invaded no interest pro-
tected by the fourth amendment.243 Pennsylvania v. Mimms 244
addressed the fourth amendment significance of an officer's re-
quiring a person stopped for a traffic violation to step out of the
car. Noting that the driver was already being detained and that
the officer could already observe much of the driver's person,
the Court concluded that the additional intrusion upon the
driver's liberty "can only be described as de minimis."245 It ap-
pears, therefore, that even an aspect of conduct that intrudes
upon interests protected by the fourth amendment may do so
in such an insignificant manner as to raise no fourth amend-
ment question.
1. Use of Force
The cases are amazingly unclear as to the extent to which
excessive force renders a search or seizure unreasonable. The
'prior announcement" cases,246 however, can be read as at
least leaving open the possibility that when unnecessary force,
i.e., force that..would not have been necessary had the officers
announced their purpose and requested opportunity to enter, is
used to gain entry to premises, it will render the entry and
search unreasonable. Schmerber,247 moreover, suggests that in
some circumstances, such as those involving an unusually sen-
sitive subject, even the force necessary to extract blood may
242. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
243. Id. at 253.
244. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
245. Id. at 111.
246. See supra text accompanying note 34.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
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render the "search" for the blood and its "seizure" unreasona-
ble. If hints from these cases accurately identify a latent fourth
amendment requirement, it is incredible that the Court has not
resolved any of the more direct manifestations of this problem,
such as the use of excessive force to make an arrest.
Perhaps the essence of fourth amendment concern is the
intrusion itself. If so, it may follow that once an intrusion is de-
termined to be permissible, the amount of force used to effect it
is not significantly related to fourth amendment interests. The
persuasiveness of this argument might be best assessed by in-
vestigating a specific search context. Consider, for example, a
standard residence search, as was involved in Sierra. Why is
this police action an infringement upon the fourth amendment
interests of the occupants? Is it exclusively or primarily be-
cause of the officers' presence within the residence? If the of-
ficers' presence is the sole basis for finding an infringement
upon fourth amendment interests, the manner in which they
gain entrance and the amount of force they use after entry in
an effort to locate persons or items is irrelevant to fourth
amendment concerns. More likely, however, the officers' pres-
ence so invades the occupants' privacy interests as to invoke
fourth amendment protection because the officers' presence af-
fords an opportunity to inflict harm upon the occupants or their
property and a perception of lessened personal security pro-
duces anxiety in the occupants. 24 8 Furthermore, the entry is in-
trusive in part because it will sometimes involve personal
injury or property damage that will affect the occupants after
the officers leave. To the extent that the rationale for regarding
the officers' conduct as within fourth amendment coverage in-
cludes these concerns, the rationale suggests that the use of
force, or perhaps even the risk that force will be used, is a mat-
ter subject to fourth amendment restrictions.249
2. Duration of the Intrusion
The absence of extensive Supreme Court decisions regard-
ing the effect of the duration of a seizure of a person or item is
especially surprising, given the apparent importance of dura-
tion in distinguishing among the various types of detentions of
248. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
249. The same seems to hold true in the context of detaining a person or
making a search after entry. In both situations, the use of force seems to in-




the person.250 The Court has permitted certain field stops upon
less than probable cause in part because of the brevity of the
detention at issue.251 Dunaway confirms that, at least under
certain circumstances, a detention upon less than probable
cause becomes unreasonable when it lasts for an "unreasona-
ble" period of time. Supreme Court cases dealing with prompt
presentation after arrest, however, show no sensitivity to the
similar issue which may arise in the pre-arrest context. The
.Court's refusal to consider constitutionalizing the warrant re-
turn requirement in Dombrowski suggests hostility toward a
similar approach to the duration of seizures of items.
Is the duration of a seizure significantly related to fourth
amendment concerns? Consider the seizure of the automobile
at issue in Coolidge. Perhaps the expectations of privacy re-
lated to a person's car are so pervasively infringed upon once
the car is validly seized that the length of time authorities de-
tain the car does not significantly affect those interests. But
why does the fourth amendment protect against some
seizures? Is it only because the right to seize items indiscrimi-
nately would constitute an irresistible incentive to expand the
scope of searches so as to locate more items to seize?25 2 If this
perception is correct, a subject's fourth amendment interests
may not be affected by the length of time an item is detained.
A more likely reason seizures are limited, however, is a recog-
nition that the extent to which one has access to physical be-
longings affects one's freedom to engage in a number of
activities. Thus one's privacy expectation of being able to exer-
cise control over one's property is affected not only by the ini-
tial seizure and removal of an item which may be useful in that
pursuit, but also by the authorities' continued retention of the
item. While this approach comes close to constitutional recog-
nition of a property right in realty or personal items, it is not an
unreasonable reading of the underlying notion of privacy. To
the extent that such a notion is part of fourth amendment pri-
vacy expectations, the duration of a seizure of property appears
to have independent significance.
The question probably can be analyzed more easily when
posed in the context of a seizure of the person. It is very diffi-
250. It is at least arguable that the distinction between an arrest and a field
stop for investigation may turn upon the officer's intention at the time of the
initial deprivation of liberty. See supra text accompanying note 105.
251. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
252. Judge Learned Hand made the argument in United States v. Poller, 43
F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
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cult to argue effectively that the initial seizure of one's person
so completely intrudes upon one's fourth amendment interest
in freedom of movement that the duration of subsequent con-
finement does not affect the underlying interest. The case law
implicitly recognizes the absurdity of this argument, and Duna-
way seems to refute it altogether.25 3 Moreover, if the duration
of seizures of the person has independent fourth amendment
significance, the interest would also logically appear to apply to
seizures of property. Although the two situations raise privacy
concerns which certainly are not identical, it is unlikely- that
they are sufficiently dissimilar to warrant differing treatment in
defining the ambit of fourth amendment coverage.
In the context of a search rather than a seizure, the dura-
tion factor may be less significant. In some search situations,
the duration of the search clearly affects the impact of the
search upon privacy interests. Among the intrusive character-
istics of premises searches such as that in Sierra is the bar
which the law enforcement activity imposes upon the occu-
pants' normal use of the premises. 254 The longer the bar to nor-
mal use, the more intrusive the search. Generally speaking,
however, the duration factor may be less important here than
in seizure contexts. Most searches do not last days or weeks,
as do some seizures. Consequently, even if fourth amendment
reasonableness is affected by the duration of seizures, perhaps
the risk that a search may be extended by several hours is not
sufficiently significant to invoke constitutional restrictions on
the duration of all searches. On the other hand, a search of res-
idential premises, for example, often involves a more pervasive
intrusion into privacy than the seizure of a limited number of
items. Thus, even if the duration of searches is generally much
shorter than that of seizures, the greater intensity of the intru-
sion in search situations justifies the imposition of limitations
on the duration of both.
3. Time at Which Search or Seizure Occurs
A decision whether the time at which a search or seizure
occurs has independent fourth amendment significance in-
volves a more difficult inquiry. The basic question, however, is
the same as that concerning force and duration: once it is ac-
253. See supra text accompanying note 125.
254. Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), police may detain at
least some of the occupants for a period while they conduct the search and de-
velop a basis to decide whether to arrest the occupants. See id. at 705.
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knowledged that a search or detention may properly occur, are
the subject's expectations of privacy so far extinguished that
the time at which the activity takes place has no significant in-
cremental effect? Once again, the analysis must be undertaken
in light of the interests that apparently underlie the fourth
amendment.
Generally, the timing question involves a decision whether
to undertake the detention or search at night. In residential
premises, more personal activities are likely to occur at night.
To the extent that searches are intrusive because they inter-
rupt personal activities, night searches may be significantly
more intrusive than those conducted during the day. Further-
more, abuse of law enforcement authority may be more prob-
able at night, because fewer witnesses are likely to be about
and darkness makes it more difficult for potential eyewitnesses
to observe any abuse that occurs. Consequently, if the fourth
amendment is concerned with the use of excessive force in
making arrests, the time at which an arrest or search takes
place also may be of concern because it may increase the risk
that such excessive force will be used.
In addition, people often feel that functioning at night is
more threatening and produces more anxiety than being com-
pelled to function during the day. This anxiety may result from
a perception that protecting oneself, as from excessive force, is
more difficult at night, although it is also probably attributable
to a vague, unspecified apprehension of darkness. Being sub-
jected to law enforcement activity during the nighttime may
thus make people more uncomfortable than a similar subjec-
tion during daylight hours. To the extent that the fourth
amendment circumscribes law enforcement conduct because of
its tendency to create apprehension, nighttime execution of an
otherwise reasonable activity may be subject to scrutiny under
the fourth amendment.
The time at which a search or seizure is conducted, may
thus affect underlying privacy interests. Whether the manner
in which it does so has independent fourth amendment signifi-
cance is less clear. It is certainly arguable that the independ-
ent effect on privacy interests of the time of a search or seizure
is less than that of the use of force and perhaps than that of the
duration of the activity. On balance, however, the impact
seems sufficient to make timing a matter of fourth amendment
concern, although the relative intensity of that impact may be
significant in addressing the extent to which the fourth amend-
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ment should place procedural restrictions on the time law en-
forcement activities may occur.
4. Conclusion
Despite almost seventy years of experience with the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has not de-
veloped the concept of "reasonableness" sufficiently to clarify
the extent to which the rule may be used to limit the force used
in, the timing of, and the duration of a search or seizure. Sev-
eral commentators have suggested that the Court's preoccupa-
tion with the warrant requirement may have left other areas of
fourth amendment law insufficiently defined.255 The Court's
basic task initially involves illumination of Katz's notion of pri-
vacy so that the ambit of fourth amendment coverage becomes
more intelligible.
The three manner-of-search issues that are the focus of
this Article clearly affect elements of fourth amendment pri-
vacy as it is currently understood. Perhaps the most important
question is whether the impact is substantial enough to war-
rant granting these aspects of searches and seizures independ-
ent fourth amendment significance. It seems clear, however,
that the question is easy to answer. Given the intrusions upon
privacy that force, timing, and duration potentially involve,
they clearly fall within the ambit of fourth amendment cover-
age. What remains to be explored, however, is whether coun-
tervailing considerations militate against extending fourth
amendment coverage to these aspects of searches and seizures.
C. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
Justice Harlan's understanding of the Katz criteria for de-
termining whether law enforcement activity contravenes the
fourth amendment requires that the expectation of privacy vio-
lated "be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' "256 This requirement apparently means that, in most
situations, the expectation of privacy violated must be one that
other persons would also hold under the circumstances. 257 In
addition, the requirement suggests that the expectation of pri-
vacy be one which the Court finds no persuasive reasons to ex-
empt from fourth amendment coverage. Only by reading the
255. Amsterdam, supra note 219, at 414, T. TAYLOR, supra note 222, at 47.
256. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
257. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-45 (1979).
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prescription in this manner can several post-Katz decisions be
reconciled with the Katz criteria.
In United States v. Dionisio,258 for example, the Court held
that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a "seizure"
in the fourth amendment sense and therefore need not be justi-
fied as "reasonable." Justice Stewart, speaking for the major-
ity, stressed that the intrusions upon privacy of a grand jury
subpoena and the resulting appearance are less than that occa-
sioned by other seizures of the person.2 59 The Court primarily
relied, however, upon its conclusion that an unlimited power in
the grand jury to secure the attendance of witnesses is "neces-
sary to the administration of justice."260 Similarly, in Hoffa v.
United States,261 the Court held that the fourth amendment did
not impose reasonableness requirements upon planting an un-
dercover agent in a position of trust which enables the agent to
overhear the subject's conversations, the contents of which
would otherwise be unavailable to law enforcement officials. In
each case, governmental action intruded upon an expectation
of privacy that the defendant actually held which almost cer-
tainly was the kind of expectation most persons would harbor
under the circumstances. Although the opinions do not openly
acknowledge it,262 both decisions apparently reflect a conclu-
sion that countervailing considerations may be sufficiently
strong to move the Court, as representative of "society," not to
recognize particular expectations of privacy as "subject to pro-
258. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
259. Id. at 10 (quoting with approval United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457
F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1972).
260. 410 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
Justice Stewart confused the analysis somewhat by emphasizing not the incon-
venience or burden of the appearance but the "historically grounded obliga-
tion" of every person to appear, apparently without question or concern, before
the grand jury. See 410 U.S. at 9.
261. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
262. The reasoning of Justice Stewart, who wrote for the Court in Hoffa, is
particularly troublesome. Characterizing Hoffa's interest as one involving the
ability to rely on his judgment that the agent would not reveal information en-
trusted to him, Justice Stewart responded that no member of the Court has
ever expressed the view that the fourth amendment protects a person's mis-
placed belief that one to whom information is confided will not reveal it. Id. at
302. Alternatively, the Court could have posed the issue as whether a reason-
able person has a protected expectation that the government will not cause an-
other to take advantage of personal relationships in order to collect information
for use against the subject. Justice Stewart suggested that the risk of being
subject to this technique is "probably inherent in the conditions of human soci-
ety." Id. at 303. This approach misconstrues the question, which is whether
the fourth amendment limits this sort of investigatory law enforcement activity.
Hoffa necessarily involves a largely undefended conclusion that it does not.
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tection." This approach, when applied to the question at issue
here, requires a consideration of possible reasons why constru-
ing fourth amendment reasonableness to include the force
used in, timing of, and duration of searches and seizures might
be so unwise as to render the expectation that one will be free
from these aspects of search and seizure conduct beyond
fourth amendment protection.
1. Avoidance of Full Constitutionalization
If particular law enforcement conduct intrudes upon inter-
ests the fourth amendment protects, it is at least arguable that
full constitutionalization of the limits upon that conduct is ap-
propriate. When a federal constitutional right is involved, fed-
eral constitutional doctrine should control all aspects of the
matter that affect the underlying protected interest. On the
other hand, the major objection to application of the fourth
amendment reasonableness requirement to the manner-of-
search issues considered here may be precisely that it would
amount to undesirable full constitutionalization of search and
seizure matters.
Assuming that such full constitutionalization would result
from the proposed construction, 26 3 opponents would argue that
it insufficiently accommodates regional variations that bear
upon law enforcement needs. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Robbins v. California,264 described as "[tihe great virtue" of
pre-Mapp fourth amendment law "that it made allowances for
[the] vast diversities between states." 265 He believed that the
majority's decision in Robbins that a warrant is necessary to
examine the contents of an opaque sealed package found dur-
ing a search of an automobile confirms the rejection of "the
true spirit of federalism" precipitated by Mapp.266 To some ex-
tent, Justice Rehnquist's criticism is wide of the mark. Pre-
Mapp law accommodated regional variations by disclaiming
any effort to enforce federal constitutional limits upon local law
enforcement. The states for the most part did not use federal
standards designed to accommodate local problems, but in-
stead permitted state law enforcement personnel and courts to
flout federal constitutional requirements.
263. This is not a necessary result; see infra text accompanying note 269.
264. 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled by United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982).




Moreover, it is not clear why a federal constitutional limita-
tion will fail to accommodate local problems. In Robbins, Jus-
tice Rehnquist decried the majority's failure to consider the
plight of law enforcement officers in sparsely populated areas
where the nearest magistrate empowered to issue a warrant
may be fifty miles from the scene of the discovery of an item in
a car.267 Nothing in the plurality opinion, however, precludes
the use of creative approaches, such as search warrants issued
by telephone, 268 to fulfill fourth amendment requirements in
such rural areas. Justice Rehnquist also failed to consider the
extent to which the consent doctrine will mitigate the impact of
the majority's holding. This doctrine permits an officer who
comes upon a package to inform the subjects that their failure
to consent to a search will result in a prolonged period of de-
tention because of the need to secure a warrant.2 69 Neither
logic nor the results of recent cases such as Robbins support
the proposition that constitutionalization will result in legal
standards that cannot accommodate regional variations or local
needs.
A more meritorious objection is that full constitutionaliza-
tion neglects state policy decisions that involve matters suffi-
ciently ambiguous that no single approach is reliable enough to
justify embodying them in federal constitutional rules. The
real issue in Robbins, for example, was whether a requirement
of pre-search judicial scrutiny of the offered showing of prob-
able cause would prevent a sufficient number of unjustified
searches to justify the additional expenditure of law enforce-
ment and judicial time and effort required. Resolution of this
issue involves a number of factual matters on which little or no
reliable information is available. How often would courts de-
clare such searches improper when first subjecting them to ju-
dicial scrutiny in a criminal prosecution? What effect would
such post-search condemnation have upon law enforcement
practice? How many searches that post-search scrutiny would
not deter would the warrant requirement prevent? What actual
burden would the warrant requirement place on law enforce-
ment, in light of the consent doctrine, other demands upon law
267. Id. at 438-39.
268. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3914(C), 13-3915(C) (1978) (oral
statement under oath transmitted by electronic communication can constitute
affidavit for search warrant; magistrate may authorize officer to sign magis-
trate's name to warrant if officer is not in magistrate's presence).
269. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (search pur-
suant to voluntary consent is reasonable; voluntariness of consent is deter-
mined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances).
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enforcement time, and other considerations? One can argue
that in the absence of reasonably reliable information about at
least some of these concerns, it is appropriate to permit the
states to resolve matters on the basis of their own speculation
rather than to constitutionalize the speculation of a five-person
majority of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the more peripherally a matter affects fourth
amendment interests, the more appropriate it becomes to re-
spect state or local evaluations of the facts of a given situation.
Robbins, for example, involved the basic decision whether to
intrude upon the subjects' privacy interest in the contents of
the container. When the question is instead the manner in
which police should execute such an intrusion, the issue may
be sufficiently peripheral to require more deference to local fac-
tual determinations than might have been appropriate in Rob-
bins. Expanding fourth amendment coverage to encompass
the means by which police execute a search or seizure might
require the Supreme Court to constitutionalize speculation
over an entire new array of factual matters, even if the prac-
tices involved are only peripherally related to the central pur-
pose of the amendment, which is the prevention of unjustified
intrusions upon privacy interests.
On the other hand, one could argue that the matters at is-
sue are not, realistically speaking, sufficiently peripheral to jus-
tify the proposed distinction. The manner in which officials
conduct law enforcement activity is often of greater significance
in determining the impact upon the subject's privacy than the
decision to engage in that activity. The decision to use deadly
force to effectuate the detention of a suspect, for example, may
implicate a subject's ultimate privacy interests. Moreover, if
one is inclined to be cynical concerning the value of the war-
rant process in preventing unjustified law enforcement activity,
limitations upon the manner of executing searches and
seizures may have far more practical effect than the require-
ment of advance judicial authorization.
Finally, full constitutionalization is not necessarily the ac-
tual or desirable result of expansion of fourth amendment rea-
sonableness into this area. It may be appropriate to regard
fourth amendment reasonableness as addressing only a se-
lected number of issues related to the execution of searches
and seizures. These issues could be selected on the basis of
their apparent impact upon underlying privacy interests and
the extent to which they involve questions of fact upon which
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speculation is necessary. Although avoidance of full constitu-
tionalization may be a desirable objective, arbitrarily limiting
the fourth amendment to the evidentiary and warrant require-
ments may be an unsatisfactory way of pursuing that goal.
2. Need for "Bright Line" Rules
If the primary purpose of the fourth amendment is to dis-
courage improper law enforcement activity, there is an obvious
need for standards that can be translated into rules of practical
value to law enforcement officers.2 70 The Court has accomo-
dated this need, albeit inconsistently and sometimes at the ex-
pense of logic, precedent, and perhaps even forthrightness.
Probably the most extreme example is New York v. Belton,271
which addressed the application of Chimel v. California2 72 to
the search of an automobile "incident to" the occupants' arrest.
In Chimel, the Court had held that, incident to a custodial ar-
rest, an officer may search "the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item."273
In Belton, Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, decried any
intention of "alter[ing] the fundamental principles established
in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches inci-
dent to a lawful custodial arrest" and turned to the task of
"determin[ing] the meaning of Chimel's principles in this par-
ticular and problematic context."2 74 Stressing the need for
rules which permit an officer correctly to determine beforehand
when a search is authorized as incident to an arrest, the Court
held that an officer may search the entire passenger compart-
ment of a car which the arrestee occupied at the time of arrest,
without regard to the ability of the arrestee to reach those ar-
eas. 275 Only a strong desire to promulgate a clear rule under-
270. See LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Proce-
dures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. CT. REv. 127, 162.
271. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
272. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
273. Id. at 763.
274. 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
275. The majority's "reading of the cases," Justice Stewart explained, "sug-
gests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of
the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within" the area of possible reach. Id. at 460. Such items, Stewart
seems to have reasoned, will be within the area of reach sufficiently frequently
that a case-by-case consideration of whether the article at issue was actually
within the area of reach is unjustified, given the uncertainty that such an ap-
proach would create for law enforcement officers seeking guidance. This ig-
nores the strong likelihood that by the time of the search the arrestees will
have been removed from the car, as in Belton. "Generally," and perhaps "inev-
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standable to law enforcement officers in the field can explain
the blatant discrepancy between the Court's purported reaffir-
mation of Chimel's principle and its approval of searches of ar-
eas which the arrestee could not conceivably reach.
It is likely that the same inclination has affected and will
continue to affect the Court's definition of fourth amendment
coverage. The Court's unwillingness to construe reasonable-
ness as a protection against undercover surveillance,276 for ex-
ample, was almost certainly influenced by what it perceived as
the impossibility of defining, with completeness, those condi-
tions under which authorities could conduct such surveillance.
Thus, the Court was unwilling to use the fourth amendment to
limit a law enforcement officer's receipt of information from a
subject's former associate who, after receiving information, de-
cided to betray the subject's confidence and disclose the infor-
mation to authorities. 2 77 The Court evidently concluded that if
it were possible to develop criteria that would exclude such ac-
tivity from fourth amendment coverage but prohibit officers
from intentionally "planting" an agent in the subject's confi-
dence, these criteria would be too convoluted and complex to
serve as an adequate guide to law enforcement officials. As a
result, the Court left the entire subject of "misplaced confi-
dence" outside fourth amendment regulation.
Expanding the fourth amendment to address the means by
which police execute searches and seizures might involve the
same difficulties posed by undercover surveillance. Given the
great variety of manner-of-search issues courts might construe
to be of constitutional dimensions, the Supreme Court would
be forced to develop a substantial body of law. If this case law
could be expected to result in a series of rules for those activi-
ties which implicate fourth amendment interests, the rules un-
doubtedly would be so numerous and complex as to provide no
practical guide for law enforcement officials. Potential long-
term dangers include not only the absence of any effective legal
regulation of the manner in which officials conduct searches
and seizures, but the development of a general attitude on the
part of police officers that the entire body of fourth amendment
requirements is so unrealistic and incomprehensible that they
should waste no effort attempting to comply with it.
itably," they will have been totally prevented from reaching the area that Bel-
ton holds can be searched.
276. See supra text accompanying note 161.
277. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1966).
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This scenario, however, is not the necessary result of con-
stitutionalizing certain manner activities. As noted earlier, con-
stitutional doctrine need only address limited aspects of the
method in which police execute searches and seizures. More-
over, there is no reason to believe that courts could not develop
reasonably clear standards in these areas. Belton, for example,
demonstrates that the Court is capable of laying down bright
line rules, even if it is unwilling to defend them on logical
grounds. In addition, manner issues may hold more promise
for the development of bright line standards than other areas of
fourth amendment jurisprudence, such as determining the suf-
ficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. The unques-
tionable need for bright line standards, therefore, cannot justify
a refusal to extend the reasonableness requirement to these
activities.
3. Alternative Sources of Protection
Constitutionalization of certain manner issues might be un-
wise if other legal doctrines cover these issues and realistically
can be said to regulate them adequately. The major doctrines
outside the fourth amendment that extend to search and
seizure activities stem from tort principles. A law enforcement
officer's use of excessive force, for example, constitutes a bat-
tery. Determining the extent to which the duration of deten-
tion gives rise to tort liability is more problematic, however.
Similarly, there appears to be little support for the proposition
that the time at which a search or seizure occurs implicates tort
principles.
There are more important considerations, however, than
the theoretical possibility of tort liability. One is the practical
value of applying tort principles and damages to search and
seizure activities. Damage liability, for example, may not ade-
quately substitute for the exclusionary remedy in certain situa-
tions. Although little empirical evidence is available, intuition
suggests that whatever problems are present with civil liability
will exist if civil liability is relied upon to remedy search and
seizure abuses. These problems may prevent civil liability
from providing realistic protection.2 78
278. Cf. Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L REv.
703, 721 (1974) (present system of civil liability is "almost completely ineffective
as a deterrent"); Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act-An Alternative to the
Exclusionary Rule, 66 J. CRim. L. & P.S. 1, 19 (1975) (individual liability pro-
vides little deterrent effect and systemic change).
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A second consideration is the extent to which the litigation
that has taken place has resulted in the development of clear
standards that courts may readily apply to police conduct. Cer-
tain aspects of law enforcement activities may be more suscep-
tible to regulation than others. Statutes and judicial decisions,
for example, have addressed the problem of the use of exces-
sive force during an arrest, although their assessments of the
appropriate criteria vary. The availability of civil remedies has
not had this effect, however, with regard to abuses in other ar-
eas. For example, one cannot say that the available tort law
provides reasonable limitations upon the force that police may
use to implement a search or upon the permissible duration of
custody following an arrest upon probable cause. Although
civil liability provides a theoretical basis to restrict means of
law enforcement, it has not yet developed any reasonably pre-
cise guidelines to control its use. Perhaps in part for this rea-
son, the imposition of civil liability does not appear to be a
practical method to discourage law enforcement officers' ex-
cesses in conducting search and seizure activities.
4. Conclusion
Although the content of the privacy interests the fourth
amendment protects has not been articulated precisely, there
can be little doubt that the force used to effectuate a search or
seizure, the time at which a search or seizure occurs, and the
duration of a search or seizure have a significant and independ-
ent impact upon protected privacy interests as they are cur-
rently understood. This view strongly suggests that courts
should construe fourth amendment reasonableness to regulate
these aspects of law enforcement conduct. Before one em-
braces this position, however, several factors should be consid-
ered. The uncertainties surrounding the many factual
determinations necessary to resolve the kinds of questions
presented by manner-of-search characteristics of police action
urge against full constitutionalization of manner-of-search ac-
tivities. Furthermore, the need for "bright line" rules suggests
that courts should consider the extent to which expansion of
the fourth amendment into this area will permit the develop-
ment of comprehensible standards to guide police officers.
Finally, the legal process may already provide alternative
means to protect privacy interests against these intrusions.-
The need to weigh each of these factors militates against
across-the-board constitutionalization. Instead, the use of
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force, timing and duration issues with respect to search and
seizure activities should be considered individually.
D. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES
This section has attempted to develop a framework for de-
termining whether several major aspects of the execution of
searches and seizures-the use of force, the time of the activity,
and the duration of the intrusion-have fourth amendment
dimensions. Part A reviewed the historical evidence which
suggests that the framers of the amendment did not limit their
concern to the evidentiary and warrant requirements. Part B
examined the extent to which these three aspects of law en-
forcement activity independently intrude into .protected fourth
amendment interests. Part C explored possible countervailing
considerations that, when analyzed within the Court's current
analytical framework, might justify excluding these three as-
pects of searches and seizures from the fourth amendment's
reasonableness requirement. This subsection develops some
tentative conclusions by considering whether there are suffi-
cient reasons to treat the incremental intrusion into privacy
each of these aspects of law enforcement conduct entails as
one that, in Justice Harlan's language, society is not prepared
to protect by means of the fourth amendment. This subsection
then examines other issues that might develop if the Supreme
Court decides to constitutionalize each of these aspects. Fi-
nally, this subsection discusses a closely related question: if
the fourth amendment imposes some requirements of reasona-
bleness upon these three aspects of law enforcement activity,
to what extent, and how, does the warrant requirement apply?
1. The Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection
a. Use of Force
Officers' use of force in conducting searches and seizures
probably has the most significant effect upon privacy interests
of any of the three aspects of law enforcement activities consid-
ered here. The case in favor of regulating the use of force
under fourth amendment reasonableness is overwhelming. A
decision to regulate the use of force, however, presents several
additional questions.
First, should the use of force greater than that which rea-
sonably appeared necessary to gain entry to make a search, or
to execute a search once police obtained entry, or to effect a de-
tention of the person, be subject to fourth amendment scru-
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tiny? An affirmative response would subject a large portion of
this part of search and seizure law to constitutional regulation.
Moreover, the criterion proposed, that the force reasonably ap-
pear to have been necessary, is arguably less than the "bright
line" standard desirable in this area. There appears to be no
practical alternative standard, however. Courts should admin-
ister the rule with sympathy for the context in which law en-
forcement officers must make decisions,2 79 but little more can
be done. The impact on law enforcement of constitutionalizing
this standard should be mitigated by the traditional imposition
of the same requirement as a matter of nonconstitutional law.
If constitutionalization does have a significant effect, this effect,
in at least one sense, may confirm the wisdom of constitutional-
ization. It suggests that pre-existing legal remedies for viola-
tion of an important limitation on law enforcement conduct
were so meaningless that the limitation itself had little practi-
cal significance.
Second, should the requirement of reasonableness prohibit
the use of even some "necessary" force? This presents primar-
ily the question whether the use of deadly force, even if neces-
sary to accomplish officers' objectives, should be barred in
certain circumstances, such as effectuating nonarrest deten-
tions or arrests in which there is no reason to believe the sus-
pect poses a danger to the safety of others. Such limitations
have been urged and sometimes adopted as a matter of non-
constitutional law.280 Adoption of such rules would bring the
area closer to full constitutionalization, although by adoption of
arguably "brighter" lines than those drawn by a general re-
quirement of apparent necessity. The balance that needs to be
struck in evaluating the rules is whether the need to safeguard
the lives of persons about whom there is good reason to believe
committed crimes outweighs the state's interest in effective law
279. Courts administer other legal doctrines with similar sympathy for the
conditions under which the legally-relevant choices must be made. Although
an assault is not criminal if engaged in for purposes of self defense, for exam-
ple, the actor's belief in the need to use force must be "reasonable." See W.
LAFAvE AND A. ScoTr, CRIMAL LAW 393 (1972). Courts give considerable lee-
way to the circumstances, however. As Justice Holmes said, "Detached reflec-
tion cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
280. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(3) (Of-
ficial Draft, 1975) (only nondeadly force may be used to effect an investigatory
stop); TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.51 (deadly force may be used to make arrest only if
offense includes use or attempted use of deadly force or there is reasonable be-




enforcement. In the case of nonarrest detentions, the state's in-
terest is reduced because the basis for believing the person
committed a crime is less than when an arrest is justified. In
arrests of "nondangerous" suspects, the state's interest is lim-
ited to enforcement of those laws which protect property and
personal security from relatively minor attacks.
The state's interest in each of these situations, however,
also includes a broader interest in preserving the integrity of
the legal process. Acceptance of the limits suggested implies
that suspects' interests in being free from life-threatening ef-
forts to detain them outweigh the state's interest in discourag-
ing evasion of apprehension and other state interests. To the
extent that acceptance of the limits would reduce suspects' in-
centive to submit to officers' efforts to place them in custody,
the effect reasonably could be expected to apply as well to per-
sons police believe have committed violent offenses. Suspects
often may be unaware of whether the officers' intent is to arrest
them or to detain them for investigation or, if the former, to ar-
rest them for an offense which under the rule would justify the
use of deadly force. Perhaps the decision becomes such a close
one, especially in the absence of reliable empirical evidence
concerning the effects of alternatives, that constitutionalization
of any position is unwise.
On balance, however, the need to compel society to con-
front these matters and the need to devise some practical pro-
tection for minor offenders and those suspected on the basis of
minimal evidence seems to justify development of some fourth
amendment limits beyond the general requirement of reasona-
bleness. Declaring the use of deadly force unreasonable in
these two contexts would be an appropriate place to start.
A third issue is whether the constitutionalization of a re-
quirement of reasonable force also suggests constitutionalizing
some incidental or implementation procedures. The major is-
sue is whether prior announcement is a requirement of consti-
tutional dimensions because of its possible effectiveness in
sometimes reducing the need to use force. Again, the matter is
a difficult one that perhaps could be best left, at least at this
stage, to state resolution. A preferable approach, however,
would be to constitutionalize the general requirement of prior
announcement before entry for any law enforcement purpose.
This is justified by the need for specific measures to implement
the fourth amendment prohibition against unnecessary force
together with the value of prior announcement in reducing in
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other ways the intrusiveness of the entry. It seems reasonably
clear that the constitutional standard should have sufficient
flexibility to permit states to authorize "no knock" entries in
the traditional exceptional situation: when there is reason to
believe such notice would be useless and when adequate
grounds exist to believe that giving notice would increase the
likelihood of violent resistance, escape, or the destruction of
evidence.
b. Time at Which Search or Seizure Occurs
The timing of a search or seizure appears to have a less sig-
nificant impact on underlying privacy interests than the use of
force. Furthermore, a general requirement that the timing of
police search and seizure activities be "reasonable" or "mini-
mally intrusive" would render a large number, perhaps a signif-
icant majority, of police actions arguably unconstitutional,
without providing a "bright line" standard for resolving cases.
Constitutionalization of such a general requirement is thus
probably unwarranted. The problem of night police activity,
however, may be sufficiently distinct from other timing issues
to permit it to be treated independently.
Reasonableness in the context of nighttime searches and
seizures should require that police conduct nighttime searches
or entries to make arrests only upon reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that delaying the matter until the next day would endan-
ger legitimate law enforcement interests, such as the success of
the search or the safety of the officers. The most reasonable
formulation of this requirement would demand that the evi-
dence tending to establish the propriety of nighttime action
meet the probable cause test. For example, a nighttime search
would require a showing of probable cause to believe that a
search conducted in the daytime would not result in discovery
of the items sought.
The rule suggested above would also apply to entries to
make arrests or other detentions of the person. A more difficult
question is whether the same rule should apply to arrests and
other detentions themselves. The frequent emergency aspect
of arrests and field detentions and the difficulty of evaluating
the effects of delay on a case-by-case basis appear to justify ex-
empting from the limited bar on nighttime activity detentions
of the person that do not require prior judicial approval. On
the other hand, when the detention is of a sort that involves
substantial predetention procedures, as under statutes which
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implement the Davis dicta and permit stationhouse detentions
for investigation pursuant to a court order, the requirement of a
justification for nighttime detentions would reasonably apply.
c. Duration of the Intrusion
The duration of law enforcement activities seems so clearly
related to their intrusiveness that explicit recognition of dura-
tion as part of fourth amendment reasonableness is inevitable.
Dunaway probably constitutes such recognition, although the
difficulty of evaluating the decision's significance demonstrates
the need for some additional explication.
With respect to nonarrest detentions, the rationale for ex-
empting the police activity from the requirement of probable
cause demands a limit upon the duration of custody, which
Dunaway appears to acknowledge. The need for "bright line"
standards requires some specificity in this area, however. The
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure would limit field de-
tentions for investigation to a duration reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purposes the Code authorizes: to identify the
person, to obtain and verify an account of the person's pres-
ence or conduct, to obtain an account of a crime the person
may have witnessed, and to determine whether to make an ar-
rest. The detention would further be subject to an absolute
limit of twenty minutes.2 8 1 Constitutionalization of such a stan-
dard may be criticized as unduly rigid, but both elements of
the standard, a necessity test and a numerically defined outer
limit, appear necessary. Similar limits must be developed for
other situations, such as the border area checkpoint stop, the
stationhouse detention for investigation, and detention of the
occupants of premises subject to a search.
An arrest, defined as a detention made for purposes of pur-
suing formal criminal charges against the person, presents
more difficult problems. Two matters in particular require spe-
cific attention. First, does reasonableness ever prohibit a so-
called "custodial arrest?" Stated affirmatively, the question is
whether reasonableness ever requires that an officer release an
arrested subject upon the subject's representation that he or
she will appear to respond to the charges. This representation
may be formalized, in the context of issuing a citation, by re-
quiring the subject to sign a promise to appear. The second
question is whether reasonableness places any limits upon




long term pretrial custody of a defendant who has been prop-
erly placed under custodial arrest. The answers to both ques-
tions turn on whether the fourth amendment limits the
duration of an arrestee's custody following a valid arrest upon
probable cause.
Conceptually, the duration of custody following arrest has
a significant impact upon the intrusiveness of the arrest. The
major question is whether countervailing considerations dictate
that the matter not be regulated by fourth amendment reasona-
bleness. Again, perhaps the primary objection to regulation is
the difficulty of establishing reasonable "bright line" standards
for what may be inherently a judgment call. The prospect of a
trial judge reviewing a patrol officer's decision that a subject
was not sufficiently likely to appear to justify field release, or of
courts attempting to develop standards for making such deci-
sions, is not attractive to those who seek to develop fourth
amendment requirements into practical and objective rules.
On the other hand, the matter is of such paramount importance
to fourth amendment interests that the effort appears
worthwhile.
In determining the permissible duration of an arrest, a ma-
jor question is whether the fourth amendment incorporates the
traditional bail limitations on the state's concern that the de-
fendant appear for trial. For example, if an officer's decision to
make a custody arrest is based not upon the perception that
the defendant will not appear to answer charges but upon the
reasonable belief that the defendant will commit further of-
fenses before such an appearance, is the custodial arrest unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment? Traditional bail
doctrine limits the considerations that can affect bail amounts
to those related to the likelihood of appearance. 282 There is in-
creasing recognition, however, that this is an unrealistic re-
quirement, which is probably widely ignored in practice.283
Whatever the resolution of this issue under bail doctrine,
fourth amendment reasonableness should not be construed to
preclude the states from considering the danger an arrestee
poses to the community when deciding whether to make a cus-
282. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
283. Cf. Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 102 S.
Ct. 1181 (1982) (suggesting but not deciding that, pursuant to appropriate pro-
cedures, the fourth amendment permits denial of pretrial release or bail where
defendant poses sufficient danger to community or where bail will not suffi-
ciently assure defendant's presence).
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todial arrest or deciding whether to release a defendant upon
the defendant's appearance in court.
A final question the arrest situation poses is whether the
duty to limit pretrial detention of persons properly subjected to
custodial arrests raises an incidental fourth amendment duty to
promptly present such persons before a magistrate. Because
the need for prompt presentation is widely recognized on a
nonconstitutional basis, constitutionalization would not be dis-
ruptive unless states widely ignore their own procedural re-
quirements. Moreover, because the presentation of the subject
before a judicial officer is central to the arrestee's right to ter-
mination of pretrial custody, and because no alternatives ap-
pear to be available, the intrusion upon state flexibility is
justified.
The impact of recognizing duration as an element of rea-
sonableness is less clear in the context of searches. To some
extent, limitations are built into existing law. A warrant au-
thorizing the search for a described item, for example, probably
authorizes only that search reasonably regarded as necessary
to determine whether the item is present on the premises. 284 A
search which lasts longer than reasonably necessary to accom-
plish its objectives is therefore unreasonable.
Finally, similar problems arise in regard to seizures. Exer-
cise of continued dominion over a seized item for a longer pe-
riod than necessary could be considered unreasonable under
the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge
recognized this. More difficult problems are associated with in-
cidental rights which may attend this limitation. The primary
question is raised in Dombrowski: does the right to limit the
state's possession of seized items to situations which serve le-
gitimate state interests constitutionalize the requirement of an
inventory and return on a search warrant? In addition, there
may be a right to some equivalent procedure following warrant-
less seizures. Such a procedure would require that seized
items be submitted to a judicial officer without substantial de-
lay. The widespread acceptance of the return on a warrant as a
matter of nonconstitutional procedure would greatly reduce the
burden of constitutionalizing this aspect. Ultimately, the value
of such judicial oversight of seizures seems to outweigh the in-
284. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(officers serving warrant for materials used in or derived from illegal wagering




fringement on state autonomy that constitutionalization would
involve.
2. Applicability of the Warrant Requirement
Given the Court's preoccupation with the requirement that
a judicial officer assess the adequacy of police information
available to establish probable cause before a search, it is not
unreasonable to anticipate that the Court may regard such pre-
intrusion judicial evaluation as appropriate for matters other
than the sufficiency of the justification for the intrusion itself.
In other words, the Court might require judicial approval not
only for the search or seizure itself, but for the use of some in-
trusive method to execute the search or seizure.
In the search warrant context, this generally would mean
that the warrant authorizing the search or seizure would also
sanction, upon an adequate showing of "reasonableness," the
execution of the search or seizure in the particular manner de-
scribed. Thus, the police officer applying for a search warrant
might seek the issuing magistrate's authorization of unan-
nounced entry, forcible entry, or nighttime service, or permis-
sion to remain in the premises for an extended period of time.
Initially, the rationale for such a requirement is the same as
that for the traditional warrant requirement: a magistrate's
evaluation of the justification for the incremental intrusion into
privacy will prevent some such intrusions before the fact, be-
cause the magistrate's evaluation will be more impartial and
perhaps better informed, and thus more accurate than that of
the law enforcement officer.
The burden imposed upon law enforcement by such an ex-
pansion of the warrant requirement would differ among several
types of situations. As applied to those situations in which the
fourth amendment currently requires a warrant or court order,
the expansion would merely increase the number of matters
courts address when considering applications for warrants or
orders. But as applied to law enforcement activity that does
not require a warrant or court order under present law, expan-
sion of the warrant requirement would require resort to an en-
tire procedure which is not otherwise necessary. The cost of so
increasing the need to utilize the court order process must be
considered when assessing the wisdom of expanding the fourth
amendment coverage to situations where utilization is not now
demanded.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the Court has not
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been receptive to the possibility that if the manner of con-
ducting searches and seizures is subject to fourth amendment
scrutiny, this scrutiny must be undertaken prior to an intru-
sion. In Gooding, this hostility is evident in the majority's fail-
ure to consider any constitutional ramifications of its choice of
one statutory provision from many which involve the role of the
issuing magistrate and nighttime service of a search warrant.2 85
In Dalia v. United States,286 this hostility is express.
The Dalia majority rejected the argument that a covert en-
try to install an interception device must be specifically author-
ized, presumably upon a showing of justification, by the court
order which gives officers authority to intercept conversations
on the premises. 28 7 Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is somewhat
285. See supra text accompanying note 68.
286. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
287. The government urged that neither the fourth amendment nor the stat-
ute required explicit authorization for covert entry. It did suggest, however,
that an issuing judge was nevertheless free to impose limits on the use of cov-
ert entry to carry out a particular order and noncompliance with such provi-
sions in an order would "presumably" justify suppression of resulting evidence.
Brief for Respondent at 55, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). The
Court did not address this argument directly. Instead, the Court stressed that
the order in Dalia "implicitly" had authorized covert entry and thus, the Court
reasoned, Dalia presented no question of executive authority to break and
enter without judicial authorization. See 441 U.S. at 258 n. 21. Perhaps the
Court intended this language to indicate that the statute authorizes, but does
not require, an issuing court to address the manner of execution and to impose
limits upon it. Where, as in Dalia, the order does not contain any specific pro-
visions regarding entry, it will be regarded as embodying a judicial authoriza-
tion to execute it in any manner permitted by statutory and constitutional
limitations. Thus, the Court may have accepted the government's argument in-
directly.
This reading of the Court's language, if it is correct, apparently creates a
discretionary right in the issuing judge to limit covert entry. Does the subject
of the investigation then have a corresponding right to have the matter ad-
dressed? A judge's failure to address the issue of covert entry in a particular
case might constitute an abuse of discretion. This result seems unlikely, how-
ever.
Further, if an issuing judge imposes limits on entry to implement the order,
on what authority would a violation of these limits require suppression of the
resulting evidence? 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1976) authorizes a motion to sup-
press on the basis that "the interception was not made in conformity with the
order of authorization. . . ." The government, and perhaps the Court, may
have contemplated that the statutory exclusionary rule would require suppres-
sion for violation of a limitation on covert entry in an order. Do these matters
carry broader ramifications? Is it possible, for example, that even if nighttime
entry need not be authorized by the judge issuing a search warrant, the judge
has authority to prohibit nighttime execution of the warrant and a violation of
such a prohibition will render the search unreasonable for purposes of the
fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule? If so, is an issuing judge's failure
to address the matter in the warrant subject to later attack? Even if some re-
view of the issuing judge's action is available, such an approach would leave
the matter largely within the issuing judge's discretion. Generally, the Court
[Vol. 67:89
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
obscure, however, and the extent to which the Dalia rule will
be applied to other search situations is unclear. Justice Rehn-
quist's comment that "nothing in the decisions of this Court"
indicates that officers who anticipate unannounced entry to
serve a search warrant must disclose this possibility in their
application for the warrant288 suggests that Rehnquist views
the Dalia holding merely as the application of a general rule
that the judge who approves a search need not consider and
authorize extraordinarily intrusive methods of implementing
the search. He also maintained that judicial approval of covert
entry would be "empty formalism," because authorization for
covert entry is "unquestionably... implicit" in every bugging
order.28 9 This statement is simply incorrect. Some bugging de-
vices are used in public areas. Others are used in quasi-public
locations such as hotel rooms, which permit installation with-
out covert entry during the suspects' occupancy.290 In addition,
the manner officers use to gain covert entry is not implicit in
every order and may have significant privacy implications. De-
pending upon the circumstances, entry by ruse may or may not
be significantly more intrusive than nighttime breaking and en-
try. Further, some investigations permit use of either bugging
or wiretapping. In these situations, the fact that bugging would
require covert entry may be an important privacy-related con-
sideration in the judge's decision whether to permit bugging.
To require the issuing judge to address covert entry issues in
bugging cases would not necessarily be the "empty formalism"
Justice Rehnquist feared.
Taking the discussion in Dalia at face value, however, the
language may indicate that Dalia is limited to those situations
in which the extraordinarily intrusive method of accomplishing
the search is the only available method. In such a case, an au-
thorizing judge's consideration of whether the facts of the case
justify the method of effectuating surveillance would serve no
purpose. Read in this manner, the case has limited significance
outside the eavesdropping context. The overall tone of the
has been unwilling to entrust important fourth amendment matters to the un-
reviewable discretion of trial judges. But see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969) (magistrates' determinations that probable cause exists to issue
search warrants "should be paid great deference by reviewing courts").
288. 441 U.S. at 257 n.19.
289. Id. at 258.
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Court's discussion, however, suggests it did not intend to limit
Dalia's holding to such situations.
Justice Powell also noted that the defendant's argument
that even if the means by which a warrant is executed should
not generally be the subject of presearch judicial scrutiny, the
effect of covert entry in Dalia involved such a significantly in-
cremental impact upon fourth amendment interests that the
Court should have required such scrutiny "parses too finely the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."2 91 If Justice
Rehnquist intended to say that physical entry into premises is
not of independent fourth amendment significance when it is
permissible to intercept conversations by persons in those
premises, his subsequent statement that, even in the electronic
surveillance situation, covert entry involves "attendant interfer-
ence with fourth amendment interests" is directly contradic-
tory. This portion of the Dalia opinion can be read as limiting
its holding to those situations in which the method of execution
does not infringe sufficiently upon fourth amendment interests
to give it independent fourth amendment significance. Again,
however, this does not appear to have been the Court's inten-
tion. Moreover, if the Court finds no independent significance
in covert entry, compared to the significantly different intrusion
involved in interception of conversations on the premises, few
if any of the other characteristics of implementation at issue
here are likely to be distinguishable. Thus, under the Dalia
reasoning, the other characteristics of search and seizure exe-
cution are unlikely to demand presearch judicial approval.
Several other aspects of the Dalia opinion may have
broader ramifications. For example, Justice Powell's discussion
cautioned that presearch consideration of various means of im-
plementing a search warrant or order may be impractical be-
cause the need for some implementation techniques may
become evident only after officers arrive on the scene and the
opportunity to involve the issuing magistrate is past.292 This
argument rests upon the "straw man" set up earlier in the dis-
cussion, stemming from the characterization of the defendant's
argument as urging that search warrants specify "the precise
manner,"293 and presumably all aspects, of execution. But, as
Justice Powell's later discussion suggests, a presearch authori-
zation requirement could be limited to those methods of imple-
291. 441 U.S. at 257.
292. Id. at 257-58.
293. Id. at 257.
[Vol. 67:89
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
mentation that are foreseeable, or, in his own words, that are
"reasonably likely" to be necessary.294 Any requirement of ju-
dicial evaluation could easily be limited to those characteristics
of search and seizure activities that intrude with independent
significance upon fourth amendment interests, and are reason-
ably foreseeable at a time when recourse to the issuing magis-
trate is still feasible.
Justice Powell also relied upon his understanding of the
Court's prior decisions, and the government's concession, that
"the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later
judicial review as to its reasonableness." 295 The Court has
never construed, however, the availability of post-search review
as to the adequacy of the showing of probable cause to dis-
pense with the requirement of a search warrant and Justice
Powell's discussion does not attempt to explain this distinction.
Moreover, the review of the entry in Dalia scarcely inspires
confidence in such review, if it is in fact available,296 as a sub-
stitute for presearch scrutiny.297
294. Id. at 258.
295. Id. at 257.
296. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
297. At the trial court level, Dalia apparently did not attack the entry as
"unreasonable" because of its absence of justification. See United States v.
Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 863 (D.N.J. 1977). But the district judge, on his own mo-
tion, undertook to engage in a post-interception reasonableness review. Id. at
865-66. The judge's analysis suggests the absence of any clearly perceived stan-
dard for review. See id. Supreme Court review was limited to the first ques-
tion in Dalia's petition, which raised only the issue of prior judicial
authorization. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Dalia v. United States, 439
U.S. 817 (1978). See also Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 241 (1979). In its
brief, the government conceded that the use of covert entry was subject to post-
interception scrutiny for "reasonableness" and defended the Dalia entry under
its perception of the standard for such review. Brief for Respondent at 48-49,
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
The bugging device at issue in Dalia was authorized only after a previous
order had permitted interception of conversations from two telephones located
on the premises. 426 F. Supp. at 863. The district judge made a general conclu-
sion that the affidavits submitted supported the need to intercept telephone
calls and conversations on the premises. Id. at 866. Without explanation, he
concluded that "oral evidence of [the] criminal enterprise [under investiga-
tion] was only available inside Dalia's business premises." Perhaps this lan-
guage was intended to address the justification for using bugging rather than
arguably less intrusive wiretapping, but this is not clear. The judge continued,
On this set of facts, I find that the safest and most successful method of
accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through
breaking and entering the premises in question.
Id. The Supreme Court apparently did not regard the reasonableness of the
entry as an issue for decision. Nevertheless, the Court addressed the matter in
footnotes. It cited the district judge's language that apparently misidentified
the device at issue as a wiretapping rather than a bugging mechanism. 441 U.S.
at 248 n. 8. Without discussing the district court's failure to articulate a stan-
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Dalia does not provide a satisfactory approach to consider-
ation of whether, when prior judicial authorization of a search
or seizure is required, officials must submit the justification for
foreseeable and extraordinarily intrusive methods of imple-
menting the court order that are not inherent in the search or
seizure authorized to the issuing judge for pre-intrusion consid-
eration. The answer turns on whether the independent signifi-
cance of the proposed method of executing the search or
seizure, although sufficient to invoke fourth amendment protec-
tion, is also sufficient to justify a requirement of prior judicial
evaluation. In resolving the question, it is appropriate to con-
sider various implementation questions individually, in light of
the likely effectiveness of post-intrusion review and the extent
to which such review is likely to be less effective than pre-in-
trusion review during the warrant process.
Both unannounced forcible entry and nighttime service, for
reasons discussed earlier, appear significantly and indepen-
dently to affect underlying fourth amendment privacy interests.
With regard to these activities, the question then becomes
whether presearch evaluation of the justification for these
methods will prevent their use in a substantial number of cases
in which post-search review would result in their condemna-
tion after the fact. Perhaps one can argue that given the press
of cases and many magistrates' lack of training in the lower
courts, it is unrealistic to expect these judges to go further than
to evaluate the basic showing of probable cause. Lower court
judges and magistrates may be neither inclined nor equipped
to pass preliminary judgment upon the narrower questions
dard for review or to address specifically the need for bugging and nighttime
entry by "breaking," the Court commented tersely, "the District Court, there-
fore, concluded that the circumstances required the approach used by the of-
ficers, and nothing in the record brings this conclusion into question." Id. In a
later footnote, the Court observed that the officers entered only twice, to install
the bug and to remove it, and that the record contained no indication that dur-
ing the intrusions the officers "went beyond what was necessary" to install and
remove the equipment. Id. at 258, n. 20. Although the district judge did not ad-
dress these matters, the Supreme Court apparently cited them in support of
the district judge's conclusion that the entry was reasonable. Id.
Despite Justice Powell's facile assumption; the record in Dalia suggests
that neither the criteria nor procedure for post-interception review of the rea-
sonableness of covert entry to install bugging devices is well understood. This
may have been the result of insufficient preparation or focus by the defense or
the lower courts. It may also have been the result of a tactical decision by the
defense to avoid litigating the reasonableness of entry because no reasonable
challenge could be raised. Cf. 426 F. Supp. at 866 (affidavit of Dalia acknowl-




whether unannounced entry or nighttime service is justified on
the facts presented. Moreover, the prospect of a trial court's
more leisurely and thorough review of the propriety of the deci-
sion to use these implementation methods, should the search
result in litigation, may itself be sufficient to stimulate law en-
forcement discretion in deciding whether to invoke these
procedures.298
On the other hand, if the warrant process has reasonable
promise and is to be taken seriously, the warrant requirement
should be expected, if required, to perform these functions as
well. To the extent that the argument against pre-intrusion ju-
dicial involvement suggests that judges issuing warrants are
either incompetent or disinclined to review applications with
care, there is no basis to distinguish judicial scrutiny of the
probable cause showing from justifications offered for unan-
nounced entry and nighttime service.
On balance, unless the warrant process is to be deprecated
as a general matter, it seems that at least those methods of
service that are extraordinarily intrusive, and both unan-
nounced forcible entry and nighttime service appear to fall
within this category,2 99 should be regarded as of sufficient con-
298. Perhaps the most influential acceptance of this cynical view of the war-
rant requirement is embodied in the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure. The commentary to the section dealing with
search warrants takes the position that reform efforts in this area present "an
inherent and basically insoluble inconsistency" between improvement of the
warrant process as a means of preventing unjustified searches, on the one
hand, and encouraging its use on the other. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, Commentary on Article 220 (Official Draft 1975). Continuing, the
commentary refers to the "present perfunctory, routine character" of the war-
rant procedure and notes that the Code itself generally follows prevailing prac-
tice. Id. The Institute's apparent position is that the warrant procedure, as
presently administered, is insufficient to constitute an effective barrier against
improper searches, that any effective change in the procedure would cause law
enforcement officers to circumvent the procedure by increased reliance upon
exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that the problem is so "insoluble"
that even attempts to develop a compromise position are not worth the effort.
299. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, despite its cynical as-
sumptions concerning the warrant process, would require an issuing magis-
trate's approval for nighttime service of a warrant, but not for no-knock entry.
See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 220.2(3), 220.3(3) (Offi-
cial Draft 1975). The commentary concerning entry notes that other provisions
of the Code authorize no-knock entry without a magistrate's approval for pur-
poses of making a warrantless arrest, see id. § 120.6(2), and suggests that to re-
quire judicial authorization for such an entry in the warrant context would be
anomalous. See id. Commentary to § 220.3, at 515. Provisions of the Code place
significant limitations upon officers' ability to make warrantless nighttime en-
tries of private premises to make warrantless arrests, see id. § 120.6(3), yet
there is no discussion as to why this is not offensively inconsistent with the re-
quirement of a magistrate's approval of nighttime service of a search warrant.
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cern to justify pre-intrusion judicial scrutiny. If such scrutiny
proves ineffective, the judicial system should reconsider the
practicality of the entire concept of pre-intrusion judicial
scrutiny.300
The commentary merely observes that "nighttime intrusions are alarming and
danger-provoking, and should not be authorized without good cause shown."
Id. Commentary to § 220.2, at 512-13. There is no discussion concerning the
propriety of requiring the magistrate to determine, before the fact, whether
good cause has been shown.
300. The shifts in federal law governing no-knock entry to serve drug search
warrants illustrate the confusion and emotion this issue can create. Prior to
1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 governed this matter. Although the statute appeared on
its face always to require prior announcement under all circumstances, the
case law strongly suggested that the judiciary would read exceptions into the
provision. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967) (common law exception for situations in which
prior notice would endanger officers applies to § 3109). Cf. United States v.
Fair, 176 F. Supp. 571, 574-75 (D.D.C. 1959) (forcible entry proper a "short while"
after knocking but receiving no response, where nature of offense and sound of
shuffling feet after knock justified conclusion that drugs were being or were
about to be destroyed). Contra United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251, 257-58
(D. Md. 1964) (no exception for situation where officers have reason to believe
that prior announcement will increase risk to their safety).
Part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1976), authorized an issuing magistrate to approve a no-
knock entry to serve a drug warrant. The legislative history suggests that Con-
gress perceived such an entry to be constitutionally permissible but not author-
ized by existing statutes. There is no indication that Congress gave much
attention to the propriety of involving the issuing magistrate in the decision
whether such entry is appropriate. The House Report's discussion of Ker, see
supra text accompanying note 47, read that case as upholding no-knock entry
even though "the judgment of the exigency of the circumstances was that of
the peace officers, not an independent judicial officer." HR. REP. No. 1444, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4566, 4592. Con-
gress did not consider the matter further, however.
In 1974, Congress repealed this provision and other statutory provisions
which impose special requirements upon District of Columbia officers. See
Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 Stat. 1455 (1974). The legislative history does not clearly
indicate whether Congress assumed that courts would read exceptions to the
requirement of judicial authorization into § 3109, or whether Congress intended
to prohibit all no-knock entries, at least under search warrants which previ-
ously would have been governed by the 1970 legislation. The Conference Re-
port on the bill discussed the perceived need to impose the same limits on
District of Columbia officers as apply to other federal law enforcement agents,
but the report does not address the no-knock provisions. See CoNF. REP. No.
1442, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5971.
The matter was addressed to some extent, however, in the House Report on a
companion bill to the Senate Bill which both houses eventually passed.
While the Committee recognizes that there exist certain, rare in-
stances where a law enforcement official, in carrying out his duty
under the law, may be justified in entering and searching property
without first notifying the citizen of his intent and without a warrant,
the Committee must caution the DEA that it is generally opposed to
this practice as a means of drug law enforcement.
H.R. REP. No. 1248, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). Does this passage reflect a be-
lief that repeal of the 1970 provision would preserve legislative authority for
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When the activity does not require prior judicial approval,
such as an arrest in a public place, the question changes. In
these situations, requiring a judicial officer to evaluate the jus-
tification for certain implementation methods would amount to
the imposition of a warrant requirement in cases in which cur-
rent law demands none. Presumably there are sufficient rea-
sons to conclude that the adequacy of the information
supporting the intrusion need not be subjected to pre-intrusion
judicial scrutiny. It seems almost necessarily to follow that
there are also sufficient reasons not to demand that manner of
intrusion issues be so scrutinized.3 01
V. CONCLUSIONS
In responding to the defendant's claims in Sierra, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court noted that, although "the language of the
fourth amendment may arguably extend to searches made with
probable cause that are conducted in an improper manner,
certain no-knock entries to serve warrants, apparently under § 3109? If so, does
it reflect a view that no-knock entries under this provision would be proper
only in more limited situations than under the 1970 legislation? If this is true,
would abandoning the requirement that a magistrate authorize no-knock en-
tries before the fact actually tighten the restrictions upon such entries?
In United States v. Carter, 566 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956
(1978), the defendant urged that the 1974 repeal of § 879(b) reflected a Congres-
sional intention that § 3109 should always require advance notice, i.e., that no-
knock entries be legislatively prohibited. The court rejected this argument, cit-
ig the Conference Report's discussion of the status of District of Columbia of-
ficers, which seemed to assume that the legislation would subject them to the
requirements of the demand for advance notice, and the exceptions thereto,
under § 3109. 566 F.2d at 1268. The court did not consider the House Report.
Despite the controversy which no-knock service of federal drug warrants
has generated, see Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Al-
leged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN's L REV. 626 (1970), Congressional
consideration of the matter appears almost totally to have ignored the choices
available, and those which were earlier made, concerning the role of the issuing
magistrate. Congress has made no effort to consider the conceptual value of
pre-issuance evaluation of the justification for unannounced entry, the practi-
cality of judicial involvement in the decision, and the extent to which the po-
tentially conflicting considerations might be balanced.
301. It is possible that use of a given procedure might not require a warrant,
for reasons including the relatively low intrusion into privacy the procedure in-
volves. On particular facts, however, the method chosen to implement the pro-
cedure might increase the intrusiveness to a level where reasonableness
demands that the warrant requirement be applied. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980) holds that entry into a suspect's home, without consent, to
arrest the suspect requires a valid arrest warrant. One way to view the Payton
conclusion is that, although arrests generally are not sufficiently intrusive to
demand the application of the warrant requirement, when an arrest involves
penetration into the security of the home the overall intrusiveness increases to




there is little explicit support in judicial decisions for this prop-
osition despite the tremendous number of cases that involve
the fourth amendment." 302 A careful review of Supreme Court
decisions discloses conflicting signals, and few definitive hold-
ings, concerning this aspect of the scope of fourth amendment
reasonableness. Under the analysis mandated by Katz, resolu-
tion of the matter should turn initially upon whether the man-
ner in which police execute searches or seizures has an
independent and significant impact upon the privacy interests
protected by the fourth amendment. If these interests are im-
plicated, however, the Court must also consider whether per-
suasive countervailing interests suggest that regulating the
manner of conducting searches and seizures by means of the
fourth amendment would be unwise. Perhaps the most impor-
tant consideration involves the value of avoiding full constitu-
tionalization of the legal standards governing law enforcement
conduct.
Applying this analysis to three major characteristics of the
manner in which police carry out otherwise reasonable law en-
forcement activities suggests several conclusions. First, the
fourth amendment should be read to prohibit the use of more
force than reasonably appears necessary to execute a search or
seizure, and to prohibit the use of deadly force, even when nec-
essary, to make nonarrest detentions and arrests of
nondangerous suspects. Second, nighttime searches and en-
tries should be considered reasonable only if police establish
probable cause to believe that a nighttime search or seizure is
essential to the success of the search. In addition, the duration
of searches should be no longer than reasonably necessary to
make the search, and limits must be developed for the duration
of nonarrest detentions. Custodial arrests for minor offenses in
which custody serves no significant state interest should be re-
garded as unreasonable, and post-presentation custody follow-
ing a reasonable custodial arrest should be barred when such
continued custody serves no legitimate state interest. Simi-
larly, the state's possession of an item properly seized should
be regarded as reasonable only for a period of time reasonably
necessary to serve the purpose for which the items were
seized.
In recognizing these aspects of fourth amendment reasona-
bleness, the Court should also constitutionalize some "inciden-
tal" procedural requirements designed to implement
302. 338 So. 2d at 615-16.
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reasonableness in these contexts. Thus, the Court should read
the fourth amendment to mandate a general requirement of
prior announcement before forcible entry, prompt presentation
of a person subject to a custodial arrest before a magistrate,
and judicial supervision of items seized and retained by law en-
forcement officers. Finally, where the fourth amendment al-
ready requires a warrant or its equivalent, the Court should
also read the warrant clause to require the issuing magistrate's
authorization, upon a proper showing, of unannounced entry by
force and nighttime execution of the warrant.
Given the amount of search and seizure litigation since the
Court recognized the exclusionary rule in Weeks, it is both
amazing and distressing that the case law contains little discus-
sion of the appropriateness of claims such as those made in Si-
erra. If the fourth amendment is to serve as an effective
safeguard of privacy interests threatened by law enforcement
investigatory conduct, these issues need to be addressed and
the scope of fourth amendment reasonableness must be cau-
tiously expanded beyond the traditional evidentiary and war-
rant requirements.
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